哈佛商學院最實用的創業課：教你預見並避開創業路上的致命陷阱
目錄
第一部 引言及創業之前第1章 引言
第2章 個人事業難題
第二部 創業團隊的難題第3章 個人或團隊創業
第4章 關係難題：建立團隊及玩火
第5章 角色難題：職位與決策
第6章 獎勵難題：股權分配及現金報酬
第7章 3R體系：整合與均衡
第三部 創業團隊之外：雇員與投資人第8章 招聘難題：適當時候請對人
第9章 投資人難題：增值與增加風險
第10章 失敗、成功與創始執行長的接班問題
第四部 結論第11章 財富vs.控管的難題
致謝
附錄A：量化資料
附錄B：新創企業與重要人員一覽
各章注釋
參考書目
序
引言
如果創業是作戰，多數傷亡會是因為戰友的砲火或自己所造成的。這很不幸，但事實就是如此。約40年前，社會學家亞瑟．史丁康（Arthur Stinchcombe）將「新組織的劣勢」（liability of newness）──新組織失敗率特別高的現象──歸因於新創企業的團隊出了問題。較近期的一項研究顯示，創投業者認為，在他們投資的失敗個案中，有65%可歸咎於這些新創企業的管理團隊。另一項研究要求投資人辨識所投資公司可能出現的問題，結果有61%的問題與新創企業的管理團隊有關。
史丁康指出的新創企業多數失敗的現象，吸引了大量學者投入研究。可惜這些研究者幾乎一面倒地聚焦於外部因素，而不是史丁康發現的更多數是在於內部的問題。我們經常宣稱，創業活動是經濟的「心臟與靈魂」，但對於危害創業成效的主要因素，我們卻驚人地無知。如學者阿瑪．拜德（Amar Bhide）所言：「我們經常讚頌創建新事業的企業家，但很少研究他們。」
這些「人員問題」困擾所有創業者及其新創企業，甚至連獨自創業的人也不能幸免。本書將詳細闡述這些問題。相關問題往往是可預見的，源自我所稱的「創業者的難題」；這些難題是幾乎所有新創企業在其發展過程中都會遇到的。其中一個難題，在公司的各個發展階段一再出現，那就是：創業者必須在財富與控管之間，也就是在增進公司的財務價值與維持對公司的控制權之間，做出某種取捨。令情況更複雜的是，創業者早期的抉擇，可能在一段時間之後產生意想不到、卻意義重大的影響；有時候這是因為創業者的某些自然傾向，如熱情、樂觀及避免衝突，導致一些短視的決定。本書探索新創企業中主要角色面對或製造出來的種種難題，從核心創業者說起，再擴及創業夥伴（共同創辦人）、早期員工，以及投資人。
我花了逾十年時間，追蹤數以百計的創業者及未來可能創業的人，收集和分析了近萬名科技與生命科學產業的創業者之資料。本書引用我的獨家數據，並且追蹤現實中的創業者，闡述他們如何處理我在研究中發現的創業難題。埃文．威廉斯（Evan Williams）是本書的主角之一，這位年輕的企業家在1990年代中期，從內布拉斯加州的農村遷居至舊金山地區；他在家鄉一家失敗的新創企業工作過後，希望能搭上網路創業的熱潮。埃文是自學成才的網頁與程式設計師，深知網路應用潛力豐厚，尤其是發展迅猛的自助出版∕自行發表（self-publishing）領域。他建立的Blogger，是最早及最受歡迎的部落格平台之一。埃文接著又建立Odeo這個早期的播客（podcasting）網站，認為這可以幫助不熟悉網路技術的人製作、發表和分享音訊內容，就像Blogger幫助數以百萬計的普通人製作和分享文字內容那般。
在這兩家新創企業以及他稍早創立與領導的推特（Twitter）中，埃文面對一些關鍵難題，也就是創業路上重要關頭的一些艱難決定；他的決定塑造了這些新創企業的未來，影響其價值，並決定了他對這些公司的控制能力（他後來離開推特，再度創業）。埃文選擇與前女友共同創辦Blogger，堅持自任執行長和控制多數股權。他的創業資金來自於他自己、親友與天使投資人（為新創辦企業提供資本的富有個人），並刻意避開創投業者。他雇用朋友（後來是志工），以低廉的成本開發相關技術。網路泡沫破滅後，在Blogger資金即將耗竭之際，有人出價收購該公司，但埃文還是拒絕出售。這項決定導致他的創業夥伴和所有員工離他而去，讓他必須尋求捐款以維持Blogger的運作。
埃文最終將Blogger賣給Google，然後和一位他認識的、有網路音訊經驗的夥伴，一起發展Odeo。他利用他出售Blogger所獲得的部分資金創立Odeo，並讓他的創業夥伴擔任執行長。他認知到播客業務的巨大潛力後，自己出任執行長，並向創投業者籌得500萬美元，後者介入了Odeo的一些重大決策。獲得創投業者出資後，埃文組織了一個經驗豐富、薪資高昂的領導團隊，希望能幫助Odeo快速發展，領先可預見的強大競爭對手，例如蘋果和雅虎。
埃文的經驗特別有意思，因為他創辦和經營Blogger與Odeo的方式截然不同，突顯了創業者有非常多樣的選擇。埃文的決策看起來顯然前後矛盾：他接受創投業者注資Odeo，但在Blogger卻堅決抵制創投公司。他在Blogger以極低的薪酬雇用朋友，在Odeo卻花大錢聘請專業團隊。他在Blogger與前女友爭奪執行長一職，最終將她擠出公司，但在Odeo卻輕易將執行長一職交給一名泛泛之交。我們將深入探討埃文的故事，檢視其決策的內在一致性，以及影響其決策的主要動機與環境因素。現行與潛在的創業者，以及新創企業的利害關係人，可藉此看清楚自身在創業路上的動機與種種難題。
核心概念與論點
創業者的生活，往往充滿零碎的片段，有時甚至看似雜亂無章。從零開始建立一個組織，或許是事業路上最混亂的事了。創業者這個群體，本身極度多樣，而有關創業者的學術研究也十分零碎，研究者著眼的創業階段、研究出發點與視角各有不同，研究結論談不上有明顯的一致性。本書以研究創業的學者、教育者、創業顧問及創業者本身為目標讀者，以一致、連貫、有系統的方式，突顯創業路上的關鍵決定，從一開始的是否創業，一直講到創業者離開自己所創公司的決定。
進入正題之前，我們必須界定一些核心概念與論點。本書集中探討創辦高潛力公司，也就是有潛力成為高價值大公司的新創企業（通常是以科學或技術為基礎的公司）──雖然創辦人隨後的決定，可能會限制了此類公司的成長。必要時，我會綜合高潛力新創企業的研究發現，以及數量較多的有關創辦小公司的文獻，但會審慎區分這兩者；後一種新創企業，則是刻意保持小規模，由創辦人親自經營。
本書所講的創業者，是如學者霍華．史帝文生（Howard Stevenson）所言，「不考慮自己眼下控制什麼資源」，就創辦新組織、追求機會的人。創業者所做的早期決定，塑造了新創企業的面貌及其成長；這種影響甚至在組織成立之前就已經開始，而且可能在公司發展的每一個階段都發揮作用。本書的核心訊息是：這些創業決定必須經過深思熟慮，絕不能隨隨便便地做出。每一個決定，都需要創業者評估多個選擇；關鍵決定，以及每一個決定之選項，比多數創業者意識到的還多。「正確」決定往往絕非顯而易見，有時甚至是反直覺的。此外，這種決定可能涉及沉重代價，令創業者非常頭痛，必須做出重大取捨。在此同時，一些最常見的決定，例如和朋友共同創業，將股權分給創業夥伴等等，往往會涉及最多陷阱。這就是為什麼我將本書討論的創業決定稱為難題。在創業者眼中，有些創業初期的決定似乎再簡單不過，但等到他們發現自己當初應當權衡哪些因素時，他們才會意外地認識到，原本以為一本萬利的決定，原來涉及著慘重的代價。
本書主要探討創業者面對的種種難題，我們從核心創業者說起，然後逐一引入創業夥伴、重要雇員及投資人等新角色，討論他們在新創企業中，如何引發顯著影響公司發展方向和結果的艱難抉擇。我們將檢視這些角色對新創企業的影響，最重要的是他們如何影響創業團隊的穩定性、公司的價值，以及創業者對董事會與執行長一職的控制能力。第11章的附錄審視退出難題；這是創業很久之後的事，和其他難題一樣牽涉著許多共同因素，只有少數創業者有幸能面對這種難題。
我們將探討主要的創業難題，以及潛在創業者應該考慮的相關問題，可分為以下類別：
1. 創業前的事業難題──我應該何時創辦一家公司？如果我對某個概念充滿熱情，但尚未累積充分的職業經驗，或是市場還未能接受我的構想，或是我的個人處境不利於創業，我是否仍應不顧一切地投入創業？
2. 創業團隊的難題──一旦決定創業，創業者將面對許多圍繞著創業團隊的難題。
a. 個人vs.團隊的難題──我應當獨自創業，還是嘗試招攬創業夥伴？
b. 關係難題──我應該嘗試招攬什麼人共同創業：朋友？家人？認識的人？陌生人？以前的同事？
c. 角色難題──創業夥伴在公司中應各自擔任什麼職位？哪些事情可以獨自決定，哪些必須交由創業團隊決定？創業團隊應如何做出重要決定？
d. 獎勵難題──創業團隊應如何分配股權及其他財務獎勵？
3. 創業團隊之外──為填補創業團隊的能力與資源缺口，以及促進新創企業的成長，創業者往往必須引入其他夥伴。這會造成新的難題：
a. 招聘難題──在公司成長的各個階段，我應該聘請什麼類型的員工？在公司成長過程中，早期員工將面臨哪些挑戰？早期員工的薪酬，是否應該與後來的員工不同？
b. 投資人難題──在公司成長的各個階段，我應該試圖引進什麼類型的投資人？這些投資人將會帶來哪些難題？
c. 創始執行長的接班問題──創辦公司的執行長為何以及如何被換掉？創業者可以如何加強對此過程的控管？創始執行長被外聘的「專業執行長」取代後，創業者與新創企業的際遇如何？
圖1.1是概括這些難題的路線圖，也是我們不時需要參考的一個圖。
本書按照非常清楚的順序，逐一討論這些難題，但在現實中，它們未必會按照這種順序出現。創業過程往往是混亂和非線性的，創業者建立公司的行動往往是即興的，而不是「照劇本演出」。例如，核心創業者往往是得到創業靈感，然後面對獨自創業還是尋找夥伴的抉擇。這是「靈感先於團隊」的創業方式，本書中的例子有潘朵拉電台（Pandora Radio）的蒂姆．韋斯特格蘭（Tim Westergren）。但是，也有一些人是先組成創業團隊，再尋找創業構想。這是「團隊先於靈感」的創業方式，本書中的例子有珍妮特．卡洛斯（Janet Kraus）與凱西．謝布克（Kathy Sherbrooke）；她們相識於史丹佛商學院，建立了緊密的工作關係，決定未來將合夥創業。她們創辦的公司，後來成了企業門房服務業者Circles。希望依序了解創業難題的讀者，可以按順序閱讀本書各章；至於對特定難題特別感興趣的讀者，則可以直接跳到討論那些難題的章節閱讀。
創業難題的共同點，比其順序更加重要。它們都是困難、卻必要的決策點，每個決策都有創業者往往未意識到的選項，而這些抉擇對於創業者及其公司均有重要的影響。每一個難題都需要審慎和理性的決策，有時由創業者一個人決定，有時則是由一支創業團隊決定。最後，本書審視的創業難題，全都傾向涉及以下三個主題。
短期後果vs.長期後果
「輕鬆的」短期決定，可能會引發長期問題；「艱難的」短期決定，卻往往可能產生最好的長期結果。創業者為了避免衝突，通常會傾向做出輕鬆的短期決定；他們屈服於誘惑，選擇迴避或延後面對難題（更遑論解決問題）──如果做出決定時必須就出錯的可能進行艱難的對話，他們便特別容易選擇逃避。假設你創辦了一家公司，並請了你的兄弟當財務長，一如本書將談到的一位創業者。如果你的兄弟表現不佳，你會怎麼辦？預先討論這種情況，或許是十分尷尬和不舒服的事，但是等到事情發生得馬上處理時，其實更令人尷尬和不舒服。創業有如結婚，是相互奉獻的宣示。為分手預先做好計畫，似乎是不恰當，甚至是有害的，但一如沒談好婚前協議就結婚，創業時若不預先做好與創業夥伴分手的計畫，有時會導致慘痛的後果。
令情況更糟的是，創業者通常會發現，相對於一開始就做對決定，糾正創業初期的錯誤往往會困難重重，而且代價也高昂得多。此外，決策往往會出現路徑依賴（path dependent）的情況：早期的決定，可能會讓創業者未來無法選擇一些對公司有利的做法。我們將檢視這些應當避免的重大錯誤，可能的話，也會討論糾正這種錯誤的方法。
創業圈內的人常說，創業過程是「一場由連串百米短跑構成的馬拉松」。創業者每一次的百米短跑，皆會面對一個影響深遠的關鍵決定。除非你非常清楚通往終點的路徑，否則你在這些短跑中所做的決定，很可能會讓你誤入歧途，甚至是被淘汰出局。
天生傾向：熱情、樂觀與直覺之危險
創業者往往對自己的行動導向與樂觀特質引以為豪，他們也確實必須具備這些特質。一個人要創業，熱情是不可或缺的；但是，在創業路上的每一步，這種熱情皆可能導致致命的後果。同樣地，創業者的天生傾向──傾向樂觀而非踏實；傾向仰賴直覺而非系統的規劃；傾向對自己的構想、公司、員工有強烈的感情，而非冷靜地分析情況──也經常帶給他們麻煩。
就說樂觀好了。對新創企業的前景過度自信和樂觀，可能導致創業者招攬親友成為員工或投資人，進而危及親情、友情和公司。因為樂觀，創業者高估了自身的成功機會（相對於競爭對手而言），高估了自己的能力與知識，低估了初期的資源需求，而且不能為可預見的問題做好準備。結果是創業者往往未能取得他們實際需要的資源，失敗機率因此顯著攀升。過度的傲慢、自信與熱情，可能妨礙創業者探索其他可行做法和做出必要的調整。此外，創業環境本身令創業者更容易陷入過度自信的陷阱。許多創業者在高度不確定和非常「嘈雜」的環境下工作，得到的反饋相當模糊，而且是基於不確定的證據。這種環境讓人特別容易出現認知偏差與錯誤，包括過度自信，以及依直覺行事（直覺是這種環境下唯一清楚的「輸入項」）。
如本書各章顯示，創業者必須不受制於直覺和一廂情願的天性，方能了解全部的選項與後果。他們在期盼理想結果的同時，必須為最壞的情況做好準備；做決定時應當深謀遠慮，而不是被動倉促。創業者可能會一再發現，如果只是跟著直覺走，他們在決策上將無法深思熟慮、充分了解某些做法的後果。
可以怎麼做vs.應該怎麼做
拜避免衝突、路徑依賴、天生傾向和對決策之長久後果無知所賜，創業者的行為，往往會顯著地偏離理想做法。在本書各章，我們將探索創業關鍵決定的各種選項（創業者可以做的），以及創業者實際上通常會怎麼做。我們也將盡可能地檢視這些決定如何影響重要結果，例如新創企業的成長、創業團隊的穩定性，以及創業者對公司的長遠控制能力；這可以幫助我們了解創業者應當怎麼做。在每一章的最後部分，我們將提出建議，告訴創業者如何做出更好的決定。
首次創業者通常並不認識我們將檢視的創業難題。他們可能不了解關鍵決定的全部選項，對於自身決定的長期後果（往往是日積月累）無知無覺。（他們甚至不知道自己正在做重要決定！）不過，即使是經驗老到的創業者，也可能會出錯；如果他們的經驗讓他們對創業難題有強烈的感受，但認識始終有限，那麼尤其容易犯錯。
較深入探討財富 vs. 控管
在介紹過有關創業難題的核心概念和論點後，我們來深入一些，看看當中最常見、最困難的一個問題。創業者不僅可能對創業的規則與行動有誤解，還可能不太了解自己的目標。許多人欽佩建立公司後親自經營、成為著名執行長、富有且具重大影響力的人。他們記得比爾．蓋茲如何從一名沉迷電腦的青少年，變成一位令人敬畏的執行長，掌管世界最大、最進取的企業之一，而且還成為世界首富。但是，能實現這種建立公司、經營致富的「創業理想」的人，少之又少。事實上，創業的一個「骯髒」小祕密是：創業路上的許多決定，即使是無可置疑的「正確」決定，通常會迫使創業者，在建立公司的價值與維持自己對公司的控管能力之間做出取捨，而令創業者偏離上述創業理想。埃文．威廉斯建立Blogger與Odeo的每一步，都面對這種取捨。他在兩家公司所做的取捨截然不同，結果自然也就迥異。
雖然對財富與控制權的渴望似乎是互補的，但做為創業動機，它們之間其實總是有一種張力。這種反直覺的衝突，源自創業者面對的核心挑戰──「資源依賴」問題。創業者必須取得外部資源（人才、資訊與資金），方能追求機會，創造最大的價值。但是，要取得這些資源，創業者通常必須讓出越來越多的控制權。創業夥伴及重要員工都希望能獲得一些股權。有技術、富經驗的員工，希望能享有某種程度的自主權。投資人希望能保護自己的投資，典型的做法是在董事會中占有可觀的席次，或是在投資協議中加入某些條款。
面對廣泛的選項，創業者可以如何做出最佳選擇？關鍵在於了解自己的每一個決定，是想達成什麼目標。同樣的道理，創業者一再面對財富（從自己的辛勤工作中獲利）與控管（維持對自己創辦的公司之掌控權）的抉擇時，明智的決策之道，在於了解自己的動機──自己創業是要追求什麼？個人的動機，幾乎總是複雜的，極少是顯而易見的，甚至當事人也往往不清楚自己的動機。不過，研究顯示，創業者最常見的兩個動機是：建立財富，以及推動和控制自己所創的公司之成長。創業者若是一再做出有利於建立財富的決定，則較可能達成我所稱的「富有」結果（較大的財務利益，較少的控制權）；創業者若是一再做出令他們得以持續控制公司的決定，則較可能達成我所稱的「王者」結果（較大的控制權，較少的財務利益）。
多項研究證實，財富與控管是最常見的兩項創業動機。考夫曼基金會（Kauffman Foundation）研究549位美國科技公司的創辦人，當中75%認為建立財富是創業非常重要的動機，64%表示擁有自己的公司也非常重要。創業動態追蹤研究（Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics）調查1,214位受訪者的創業動機，結果前六大動機或是與控管有關（例如可以自由選擇工作方式和實踐個人願景），或是與財富有關（例如獲得財務保障及建立巨額財富）。「事業領袖」（CareerLeader）資料庫中有世界各地超過2,000名企業家（以及共2.7萬名企業主管）的資料，分析顯示，20至39歲男性企業家的前四大動機，全部與控管和致富有關。其他動機，例如智能挑戰、利他及名望，也可能很重要，但就創業者整體而言，財富與控管是最重要的兩大動機，也是彼此一再衝突的兩項動機。
創業者若清楚知道自己的首要動機是財富或控管，決策時將能較為從容，而且可以做出一致的決定，提升自己達成目標（富有或王者）的機率。圖1.2概括本書第二部及第三部將討論的財富vs.控管難題，最後一章也將回到這主題（在第11章，我們也將探討刻意做出不一致的決定，以及嘗試同時追求最大的財富與控制權之潛在的好處與風險）。不過，動機未必是固定不變的。創業者也必須注意自身動機的變化；我們將檢視促成這種改變的因素，以及它們如何影響創業者隨後的決定。
未解之謎
新框架或模型的考驗之一，是看它能否解釋未解之謎。本書將探索創業之謎，包括「失蹤的私人股權溢價」（the missing private-equity premium），以及以下說法：創業者在其公司並非多數人想像的那麼有力。
多數經濟學家假定，企業家希望賺很多錢。某研究者就表示：「企業家追求利潤最大化，是經濟理論最基本的假設之一。」學者早就提出，企業家希望藉由擁有高價值新創企業的股權，建立個人財富；近年一項研究支持這種說法，發現許多高科技公司的創辦人相信自己藉由創業，成為有錢人的機率遠高於一般就業。
如果很多創業者真的這麼想，那他們似乎都搞錯了。平均而言，企業家創辦公司所賺的錢，並不比他們從投資上市公司股票所能賺到的多──從風險報酬的角度來看，創業其實賺得較少。一項針對新創企業的大型研究發現，平均而言，風險胃納正常、儲蓄不多的潛在企業家，創辦由創投業者支持的公司是划不來的。此外，相對於受薪人士，自雇人士起初的收入較低，而且收入成長速度顯著較慢；研究者使用多種收入指標，在多個產業都證實了這一點。總的來說，創業者十年間的收入，比他們從事受薪工作可賺到的少35%。這些研究者因此覺得奇怪：如果真的沒有「私人股權溢價」，為什麼會有那麼多聰明人想創業？本書在第2章至第10章提供部分答案，而第11章則提出一個全面的答案：創業者面對一個接一個的決定，必須在增進自身財富與維持公司控制權之間做出抉擇。創業者選擇走「王者」之路，最終將犧牲一些財富。
接下來，我們講講創業者的權力。許多學術研究假定創業者──構想出創業計畫，集結人才與資源的人──在其新創企業中，是非常有力的人。「尊敬的創始人」怎麼可能不是有力人士？但是，本書提出的證據，將否定又一個基本假設。我的量化研究發現，很高比例的創始執行長會被撤換，而且往往是被迫的。大眾常常想到比爾．蓋茲、理察．布蘭森（Richard Branson）、安妮塔．羅迪克（Anita Roddick）及麥可．戴爾等商業鉅子，他們創業致富，擔任所創公司的執行長，具有相當大的影響力；但是，這些人是非常罕見的例外。常見的情況是，創始執行長在公司距離股票上市還很遠時，就被撤換掉了。我們可以怎麼解釋這種情況？而且，為什麼創業者的平均所得，顯著低於非創業者？等我們在第11章再度探討這些議題時，你會發現，這些看似費解的事，皆有其道理。
學術文獻多半顯示，財富與權力相輔相成。例如，在米爾斯（C. Wright Mills）針對「權力精英」的經典分析中，高階經理人的企業權力與經濟財富便相得益彰：在企業中的職權是財富的來源，而「金錢帶來權力」。但是，我的研究發現，對創業者來說，財富與權力並無互補作用，而且往往彼此衝突。因此，高潛力公司的創辦人極少能同時成就財富與權力；多數人選擇追求其中一樣，而且往往一無所得。有些企圖財權兼收的策略雖然看似合理，但實際上卻更可能讓創業者兩者皆失。這情況無疑令人沮喪，我們將探討其成因。
近萬名創業者的資料
為求嚴謹地描述最重要的創業決定及其結果，提供豐富的資料，本書結合深入的案例分析，以及使用一個獨特的大型資料庫做為基礎的量化分析。因為有關新創企業並無全面的公共資料源，我藉由每年調查美國民間的高潛力新創企業，建立自己的資料庫。我的調查收集有關每一家公司的創辦人、非創業主管、薪酬與持股、融資記錄、董事會及組織生活其他面向的資料。從2000至2009年，我連續十年做這項調查，建立了涵蓋3,607家新創企業、9,900名創業者，以及逾1.9萬位經理人的獨特資料庫。在規模與豐富程度相近的資料庫中，我的數據最能代表美國的高潛力新創企業。我做調查的十年包含景氣循環的所有階段，從網路創業榮景的高峰，到悲觀沮喪的谷底，以及隨後的復甦，皆在其中。這些數據因此是本書各章的量化資料支柱。附錄A提供受訪公司的詳細特徵，以及我對創業者提出的問題。
我的數據與案例分析，均聚焦於高潛力新創企業的兩大核心產業：科技和生命科學。新創企業創造的就業機會與吸引的資金，都以這兩個產業為主。2000至2009年間的首次公開發行（IPO），48%來自於這兩個產業，其他產業所占的比率均低於12%。此外，在這十年間，天使投資人所投資的資金，有74%流向這兩個產業，創投資本的比率也有71%。每年新成立的低科技「小企業」（越來越多研究以它們為對象）比高潛力新創企業多得多，但這些小企業多半沒有什麼員工，也沒有成長或創新的意圖。創業活動促成的經濟成長，因此主要源自高潛力新創企業。
因為聚焦於美國的科技與生命科學新創企業，我們得以檢視財富與控管之間的張力；這種張力在這些公司尤其顯著，因為它們對外部資源有很強的需求，而且創業者取得這些資源的條件也往往涉及財富與控管之取捨。因為我們研究的公司包括大量科技與生命科學新創企業，我們得以比較一些截然不同的產業之情況，評估哪些形態為某些產業所特有。如果我們發現某些形態為這兩類產業所共有，我們便能較有信心地認為，其他產業通常也是這樣。另一方面，此處描述的形態在多大程度上適用於美國以外，則是未有定論的問題，值得做一些實證分析。許多國家因為融資選擇有限，創業者可能無法考慮第9章提到的，與引進投資人有關的一些選擇；富經驗的經理人有限，則可能讓創業者不必面對第8章所敘述的一些招聘難題。在其他產業，例如非資本密集產業，或是可以預收顧客款項的產業（例如主要以預付訂購模式運作的產業），創業者或許可以自行融資，不必考慮引進外來資本。本書提到的創業難題，在多大程度上適用於這些產業，也是未有定論的問題；第11章將詳細討論這個問題。簡介本書主要案例本書將檢視30多個高潛力新創企業案例，當中我特別重視的有七個，因為這些創業者面對的難題可為我們提供一些洞見，而且整體而言，他們能幫助我們認識非常多樣的情況、難題、決定、取捨，以及結果。圖1.3概括這七位創業者的背景、創業團隊，以及他們的招聘決策與投資人選擇。當中的埃文．威廉斯已經介紹過了，以下簡介另外六位創業者，以及他們面對的創業難題。
潘朵拉電台的蒂姆．韋斯特格蘭是最不像創業者的人。他在史丹佛大學主修鋼琴和政治科學，之後當過保母，也曾在史丹佛入學處工作，還建立了一個搖滾樂團，巡迴演出近十年後，決定當一個自由作曲人。期間他興起創立一個音樂資料庫的構想（他稱之為「音樂基因組計畫」），根據非常多樣的特性，將音樂分門別類，向用戶建議符合其品味的新藝人和歌曲。1999年，蒂姆遇上矽谷企業家喬恩．卡夫（Jon Kraft）。兩人決定實踐蒂姆的構想，成立了潘朵拉（最初命名為「野獸」〔Savage Beast〕），並引進富才華的軟體工程師威爾．格雷瑟（Will Glaser）為創業夥伴和技術長。三個人平分股權，根據各自的技能清楚分工，可以在各自負責的領域內自行決定聘請什麼人，以及如何運作。但是，隨著公司的資金逐漸耗竭，創辦人和員工被迫暫停支薪，創業團隊的分工及組織結構令三位夥伴的關係變得十分緊張，並加深了個人問題，導致喬恩退出，留下來的兩個人也面臨一連串的問題。
馬瑟奇（Masergy）的巴里．諾爾斯（Barry Nalls）也是一個背景有趣的人。創業圈中的人，可能會稱他是一個大器晚成者（late bloomer）──巴里承認這一點，但後悔自己太晚起步。他畢業後就加入大型電訊業者吉悌電信（GTE），效力25年之久，穩步晉升，累積了豐富的銷售和負責業務盈虧的經驗，以及其他行政技能。吉悌宣布合併計畫時，巴里選擇離職，接著替數家年輕企業工作。最後他終於決定創業，建立電訊服務業者馬瑟奇。巴里自稱是「獨行者」，他決定獨立創業，自任馬瑟奇的執行長，以前雇主支付的六個月遣散費為資本，後來才向創投公司籌集了數百萬美元的資金。雖然他豐富的工作經驗對於創業十分有用，但巴里要到真正創業後，才在替快速成長的新創企業招聘員工、管理董事會，以及處理銷售與營運間的張力等方面時，學到了關鍵教訓。
Smartix的維韋克．庫拉（Vivek Khuller）面對的問題，則與巴里截然不同：一名年輕的企管碩士生（MBA），有能力徹底革新一個他幾乎一無所知的行業嗎？維韋克在一家投資銀行當暑期實習生時，產生以下構想：運動與娛樂場地可以應用電子票務技術，繞過像Ticketmaster這種票務代理，直接管理自己的票務。維韋克在他的MBA班上招攬創業夥伴，選了兩位背景與他相似的聰明同學。維韋克透過商學院的人脈，向數個著名場地推銷他的構想，而他們也有興趣與Smartix合作。此外，他也向數家頂尖創投公司提出他的構想，其中一家向他開出了投資條件。但是，他創業初期的決定，很快便開始困擾著他。
保母城（Sittercity）的吉納維芙．蒂埃爾（GenevieveThiers），則是為一個非常個人的問題感到頭痛：她最重要的同事，是她的未婚夫丹（Dan）。如果她和丹分手，對她的公司會有何影響？如果兩人的工作關係變壞，對兩人的感情關係有何影響？吉納維芙幫一名孕婦張貼招聘保母的告示時，萌生建立保母城的構想。她回想自己當職業保母的經驗，認為建立一個網站，幫助為人父母者快速找到保母，應該有利可圖。她畢業後在IBM當技術寫手，業餘則發展唱歌劇的興趣，並利用閒暇建立保母城。IBM撤掉她的部門時，她決定全職投入發展保母城。隨著公司規模擴大，她招攬丹為技術顧問，兩人密切合作。丹最終成為營運長，但吉納維芙對此感到不安。她必須有創意地建立必要的「防火牆」，免得自己選擇的創業夥伴造成了傷害。
奧康科技（Ockham Technologies）的吉姆．柴安迪福（Jim Triandiflou
★Inc.雜誌評選為美國頂尖創業課程！
獨資好？還是合資好？
怎麼劃分職位與權責歸屬？
該分配股權？還是用現金獎賞？
如何找到對的人？用熟人好嗎？
引進創投資金會不會影響控管權？
是不是該讓創始人下台一鞠躬了……
所有想創業與已創業者都會碰到的許多難題，
本書為你逐一臚列，並告訴你大多數成功者的因應之道。
《出版人週刊》（Publishers Weekly）大讚：
這是一本影響深遠之作，更是商學院課程的必讀佳作。
本書極富啟發性，十分迷人，能吸引雄心勃勃的新創業者，
以及希望在既有企業做出更好決策的創業家。
諾姆．華瑟曼根據十年來的研究，完成這堪稱是第一本檢視創業者早期決定的相關著作，並深入探討創業者必須面對的兩難困境與因應之道，包括與親友共同創業是否明智、怎麼做才能讓員工適才適所、創業團隊應於何時分配股權，以及如何辨識是時候該讓創始執行長離開或是直接撤換掉等等。
此外，有些嚴重錯誤可能會分裂創業團隊，令創業者失去對公司的控制權，或是讓創業者的辛勞付出與創意無法獲得金錢報酬，本書就是要教你先行預見並避免誤入陷阱，或是在犯錯後能獲得收復失土的方法。
作者還引述推特的埃文．威廉斯和潘朵拉電台的蒂姆．韋斯特格蘭……等創業事例，採用近萬名創業者的量化資料，描繪出一個清楚且完整的路線圖，指引創業者在關鍵時刻做出最正確、最合適的決策。
作者簡介
諾姆．華瑟曼（Noam Wasserman）
為哈佛商學院教授暨塔克曼研究員（Tukman Faculty Fellow）。逾十年來，集中研究攸關新創企業與創業團隊存亡的創業者早期決策。在哈佛商學院設計並傳授「創業者的難題」這門MBA選修課程，還因此榮獲哈佛商學院教學獎及管理學會2010年教學創新獎。2011年，該課程更被Inc.雜誌評選為美國頂尖創業課程之一。
自2000年起，擔任CompStudy年度調查的主要研究員。為考夫曼基金會（Kauffman Foundation）全球學者計畫三位核心成員之一，曾在青年總裁組織（YPO）、創投資本及創業團隊等組織的會議上多次發表主題演講。
其研究成果發表於《哈佛商業評論》、《管理學會期刊》、《組織科學》、《管理學會最佳論文選輯》與其他刊物上。曾經榮獲哈佛George S. Dively論文研究獎、Aage Sorensen社會學研究紀念獎，以及連續四年獲得管理學會（商業政策與策略部）傑出審閱者獎，並曾獲頒貝克學者獎的殊榮。
譯者簡介
許瑞宋
suisung@kimo.com
香港科技大學會計系畢業，曾任路透中文新聞部編譯、培訓編輯與責任編輯，亦曾從事審計與證券研究工作。2011年榮獲第一屆林語堂文學翻譯獎。
譯有《數位新分享時代》、《下一個失落十年投資之道》、《坦伯頓不敗投資法》、《如何評價一支股票》及《未來，你一定要知道的100個超級趨勢》等書。
The Founder's Dilemmas: Anticipating and Avoiding the Pitfalls That Can Sink a Startup (The Kauffman Foundation Series on Innovation and Entrepreneurship) Paperback – March 31, 2013
- Paperback: 496 pages
- Publisher: Princeton University Press; 1st edition (March 31, 2013)
The Founder’s DilemmaNoam WassermanFROM THE FEBRUARY 2008 ISSUE hbr
Every would-be entrepreneur wants to be a Bill Gates, a Phil Knight, or an Anita Roddick, each of whom founded a large company and led it for many years. However, successful CEO-cum-founders are a very rare breed. When I analyzed 212 American start-ups that sprang up in the late 1990s and early 2000s, I discovered that most founders surrendered
management control long before their companies went public. By the time the ventures were three years old, 50% of founders were no longer the CEO; in year four, only 40% were still in the corner office; and fewer than 25% led their companies’ initial public offerings. Other researchers have subsequently found similar trends in various industries and in other time periods. We remember the handful of founder-CEOs in corporate America, but they’re the exceptions to the rule.
Founders don’t let go easily, though. Four out of five entrepreneurs, my research shows, are forced to step down from the CEO’s post. Most are shocked when investors insist that they relinquish control, and they’re pushed out of office in ways they don’t like and well before they want to abdicate. The change in leadership can be particularly damaging when employees loyal to the founder oppose it. In fact, the manner in which founders tackle their first leadership transition often makes or breaks young enterprises.
The transitions take place relatively smoothly if, at the outset, founders are honest about their motives for getting into business. Isn’t that obvious, you may ask. Don’t people start a business to make pots of money? They do. However, a 2000 paper in theJournal of Political Economy and another two years later in the American Economic Review showed that entrepreneurs as a class make only as much money as they could have if they had been employees. In fact, entrepreneurs make less, if you account for the higher risk. What’s more, in my experience, founders often make decisions that conflict with the wealth-maximization principle. As I studied the choices before entrepreneurs, I noticed that some options had the potential for generating higher financial gains but others, which founders often chose, conflicted with the desire for money.
ExhibitTitle The Trade-Off Entrepreneurs Make
ExhibitCaption Founders’ choices are straightforward: Do they want to be rich or king? Few have been both.
The reason isn’t hard to fathom: There is, of course, another factor motivating entrepreneurs along with the desire to become wealthy: the drive to create and lead an organization. The surprising thing is that trying to maximize one imperils achievement of the other. Entrepreneurs face a choice, at every step, between making money and managing their ventures. Those who don’t figure out which is more important to them often end up neither wealthy nor powerful.
Inside the Founder’s Mind
Founders are usually convinced that only they can lead their start-ups to success. “I’m the one with the vision and the desire to build a great company. I have to be the one running it,” several entrepreneurs have told me. There’s a great deal of truth to that view. At the start, the enterprise is only an idea in the mind of its founder, who possesses all the insights about the opportunity; about the innovative product, service, or business model that will capitalize on that opportunity; and about who the potential customers are. The founder hires people to build the business according to that vision and develops close relationships with those first employees. The founder creates the organizational culture, which is an extension of his or her style, personality, and preferences. From the get-go, employees, customers, and business partners identify start-ups with their founders, who take great pride in their founder-cum-CEO status.
New ventures are usually labors of love for entrepreneurs, and they become emotionally attached to them, referring to the business as “my baby” and using similar parenting language without even noticing. Their attachment is evident in the relatively low salaries they pay themselves. My study of compensation in 528 new ventures set up between 1996 and 2002 showed that 51% of entrepreneurs made the same money as—or made less than—at least one person who reported to them. Even though they had comparable backgrounds, they received 20% less in cash compensation than nonfounders who performed similar roles. That was so even after taking into account the value of the equity each person held.
Many entrepreneurs are overconfident about their prospects and naive about the problems they will face. For instance, in 1988, Purdue University strategy scholar Arnold Cooper and two colleagues asked 3,000 entrepreneurs two simple questions: “What are the odds of your business succeeding?” and “What are the odds of any business like yours succeeding?” Founders claimed that there was an 81% chance, on average, that they would succeed but only a 59% probability of success for other ventures like their own. In fact, 80% of the respondents pegged their chances of success at at least 70%—and one in three claimed their likelihood of success was 100%. Founders’ attachment, overconfidence, and naïveté may be necessary to get new ventures up and running, but these emotions later create problems.
Growing Pains
Founders eventually realize that their financial resources, ability to inspire people, and passion aren’t enough to enable their ventures to capitalize fully on the opportunities before them. They invite family members and friends, angel investors, or venture capital firms to invest in their companies. In doing so, they pay a heavy price: They often have to give up total control over the enterprise. Angel investors may allow entrepreneurs to retain control to a greater degree than venture capital firms do, but in both cases, outside directors will join the company’s board.
Once the founder is no longer in control of the board, his or her job as CEO is at risk. The board’s task is straight-forward if the founder underperforms as CEO, although even when founders are floundering, boards can have a hard time persuading them to put their “babies” up for adoption. But, paradoxically, the need for a change at the top becomes even greater when a founder has delivered results. Let me explain why.
The first major task in any new venture is the development of its product or service. Many founders believe that if they’ve successfully led the development of the organization’s first new offering, that’s ample proof of their management prowess. They think investors should have no cause for complaint and should continue to back their leadership. “Since I’ve gotten us to the stage where the product is ready, that should tell them that I can lead this company” is a common refrain.
Their success makes it harder for founders to realize that when they celebrate the shipping of the first products, they’re marking the end of an era. At that point, leaders face a different set of business challenges. The founder has to build a company capable of marketing and selling large volumes of the product and of providing customers with after-sales service. The venture’s finances become more complex, and the CEO needs to depend on finance executives and accountants. The organization has to become more structured, and the CEO has to create formal processes, develop specialized roles, and, yes, institute a managerial hierarchy. The dramatic broadening of the skills that the CEO needs at this stage stretches most founders’ abilities beyond their limits.
A technology-oriented founder-CEO, for instance, may be the best person to lead a start-up during its early days, but as the company grows, it will need someone with different skills. Indeed, in analyzing the boards of 450 privately held ventures, I found that outside investors control the board more often where the CEO is a founder, where the CEO has a background in science or technology rather than in marketing or sales, and where the CEO has on average 13 years of experience.
Thus, the faster that founder-CEOs lead their companies to the point where they need outside funds and new management skills, the quicker they will lose management control. Success makes founders less qualified to lead the company and changes the power structure so they are more vulnerable. “Congrats, you’re a success! Sorry, you’re fired,” is the implicit message that many investors have to send founder-CEOs.
Investors wield the most influence over entrepreneurs just before they invest in their companies, often using that moment to force founders to step down. A recent report inPrivate Equity Week pithily captures this dynamic: “Seven Networks Inc., a Redwood City, Calif.-based mobile email company, has raised $42 million in new venture capital funding….In other Seven news, the company named former Onebox.com CEO Russ Bott as its new CEO.”
The founder’s moment of truth sometimes comes quickly. One Silicon Valley?based venture capital firm, for instance, insists on owning at least 50% of any start-up after the first round of financing. Other investors, to reduce their risk, dole money out in stages, and each round alters the board’s composition, gradually threatening the entrepreneur’s control over the company. Then it usually takes two or three rounds of financing before outsiders acquire more than 50% of a venture’s equity. In such cases, investors allow founder-CEOs to lead their enterprises longer, since the founder will have to come back for more capital, but at some point outsiders will gain control of the board.
Whether gradual or sudden, the transition is often stormy. In 2001, for instance, when a California-based internet telephony company finished developing the first generation of its system, an outside investor pushed for the appointment of a new CEO. He felt the company needed an executive experienced at managing the other executives who oversaw the firm’s existing functions, had deeper knowledge of the functions the venture would have to create, and had experience in instituting new processes to knit together the company’s activities. The founder refused to accept the need for a change, and it took five pressure-filled months of persuasion before he would step down.
He’s not the only one to have fought the inevitable; four out of five founder-CEOs I studied resisted the idea, too. If the need for change is clear to the board, why isn’t it clear to the founder? Because the founder’s emotional strengths become liabilities at this stage. Used to being the heart and soul of their ventures, founders find it hard to accept lesser roles, and their resistance triggers traumatic leadership transitions within young companies.
Time to Choose
As start-ups grow, entrepreneurs face a dilemma—one that many aren’t aware of, initially. On the one hand, they have to raise resources in order to capitalize on the opportunities before them. If they choose the right investors, their financial gains will soar. My research shows that a founder who gives up more equity to attract cofounders, nonfounding hires, and investors builds a more valuable company than one who parts with less equity. The founder ends up with a more valuable slice, too. On the other hand, in order to attract investors and executives, entrepreneurs have to give up control over most decision making.
Choosing money: A founder who gives up more equity to attract investors builds a more valuable company than one who parts with less—and ends up with a more valuable slice, too.
This fundamental tension yields “rich” versus “king” trade-offs. The “rich” options enable the company to become more valuable but sideline the founder by taking away the CEO position and control over major decisions. The “king” choices allow the founder to retain control of decision making by staying CEO and maintaining control over the board—but often only by building a less valuable company. For founders, a “rich” choice isn’t necessarily better than a “king” choice, or vice versa; what matters is how well each decision fits with their reason for starting the company.
Consider, for example, Ockham Technologies’ cofounder and CEO Jim Triandiflou, who realized in 2000 that he would have to attract investors to stay in business. Soon, he had several suitors wooing him, including an inexperienced angel investor and a well-known venture capital firm. The angel investor’s offer would have left Triandiflou in control of the board: Joining him on it would be only his cofounder and the angel investor himself. If he accepted the other offer,though, he would control just two of five seats on the board. Triandiflou felt that Ockham would grow bigger if he roped in the venture capital firm rather than the angel investor. After much soul-searching, he decided to take a risk, and he sold an equity stake to the venture firm. He gave up board control, but in return he gained resources and expertise that helped increase Ockham’s value manifold.
Similarly, at Wily Technology, a Silicon Valley enterprise software company, founder Lew Cirne gave up control of the board and the company in exchange for financial backing from Greylock Partners and other venture capital firms. As a result, CA bought Wily two years later for far more money than it would have if Cirne had tried to go it alone.
On the other side of the coin are founders who bootstrap their ventures in order to remain in control. For instance, John Gabbert, the founder of Room & Board, is a successful Minneapolis-based furniture retailer. Having set up nine stores, he has repeatedly rejected offers of funding that would enable the company to grow faster, fearing that would lead him to lose control. As he told BusinessWeek in October 2007, “The trade-offs are just too great.” Gabbert is clearly willing to live with the choices he has made as long as he can run the company himself.
Most founder-CEOs start out by wanting both wealth and power. However, once they grasp that they’ll probably have to maximize one or the other, they will be in a position to figure out which is more important to them. Their past decisions regarding cofounders, hires, and investors will usually tell them which they truly favor. Once they know, they will find it easier to tackle transitions.
Founders who understand that they are motivated more by wealth than by control will themselves bring in new CEOs. For example, at one health care–focused internet venture based in California, the founder-CEO held a series of discussions with potential investors, which helped him uncover his own motivations. He eventually told the investors that he wanted to “do as well as I can from an equity perspective…[and do] what will be required for the company to be successful in the long run.” Once he had articulated that goal, he started playing an active role in the search for a new CEO. Such founders are also likely to work with their boards to develop post-succession roles for themselves.
Keeping Founders on Board
What do boards do with founders after asking them to step down as CEO? Ideally, a board should keep the founder involved in some way, often as a board member, and use his or her relationships and knowledge to help the new CEO succeed. As one investor stated, “You can replace an executive, but you can’t replace a founder.”
Many times, keeping the founder on board is easier said than done. Founders can act, sometimes unconsciously, as negative forces. They can resist the changes suggested by new CEOs and encourage their loyalists to leave. Some boards and CEOs try to manage those risks by taking half-measures, relegating the founder to a cosmetic role, but that can backfire. For instance, at Wily Technology, Lew Cirne agreed to become chief technology officer after giving up the CEO’s post; later he saw that not a single person reported to him. His successor also wanted Cirne to give up his position as board chairman. These moves increased Cirne’s unhappiness.
In my study of succession in technology start-ups, I found that 37% of founder-CEOs left their companies when a professional CEO came in, 23% took a position below the CEO, and 40% moved into the chairman’s role. Another study of high-growth firms reported that, of the founder-CEOs who were replaced, around 25% left their companies while 50% remained on the board of directors for the next five years.
Boards can sometimes help founders find new roles. When a founder has an affinity for a particular functional area, such as engineering, the board can offer him or her the luxury of focusing on that area and letting the new CEO “take on all the things you don’t like to do.” That approach helps founders gain an appreciation for the new CEO’s abilities. The more concrete value the new CEO adds, the easier it will be for the founder to accept the transition. What’s more, the less similar the new CEO is to the founder—if the new CEO is 10 years older, for instance—the easier it is for the founder to accept the change.
Founders who want to be CEO for a longer time in their next venture need to learn new skills. Accordingly, boards can encourage founders to take on new roles in their companies that will enable them to do so. If they do, founders may even become accomplished enough to regain control. For example, in 1998, when E Ink’s board appointed a new CEO, cofounder Russ Wilcox identified skills he needed to strengthen. He therefore rotated through roles in finance, product marketing, sales, and even R&D to fill the gaps in his skill set. In 2004, when the board launched a search for the company’s next CEO, it couldn’t find anyone more qualified for the job than Wilcox himself and made him CEO—a position he has held ever since.
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By contrast, founders who understand that they are motivated by control are more prone to making decisions that enable them to lead the business at the expense of increasing its value. They are more likely to remain sole founders, to use their own capital instead of taking money from investors, to resist deals that affect their management control, and to attract executives who will not threaten their desire to run the company. For instance, in 2002, the founder-CEO of a Boston-based information technology venture wanted to raise $5 million in a first round of financing. During negotiations with potential investors, he realized that all of them would insist on bringing in a professional CEO. Saying that he “was not going to hand the company over to someone else,” the entrepreneur decided to raise only $2 million, and he remained CEO for the next two years.
Choosing power: Founders motivated by control will make decisions that enable them to lead the business at the expense of increasing its value.
One factor affecting the founder’s choices is the perception of a venture’s potential. Founders often make different decisions when they believe their start-ups have the potential to grow into extremely valuable companies than when they believe their ventures won’t be that valuable. For instance, serial entrepreneur Evan Williams built Pyra Labs, the company that coined the term “blogger” and started the Blogger.com site, without the help of outside investors and eventually sold it to Google in 2003. By contrast, two years later, for his next venture, the podcasting company Odeo, Williams quickly brought in Charles River Ventures to invest $4 million. Asked why, Williams told the Wall Street Journal in October 2005: “We thought we had the opportunity to do something more substantial [with Odeo].” Having ceded control quickly in an effort to realize the substantial potential of the company, Williams has had a change of heart, buying back the company in 2006 and regaining his kingship.
Some venture capitalists implicitly use the trade-off between money and control to judge whether they should invest in founder-led companies. A few take it to the extreme by refusing to back founders who aren’t motivated by money. Others invest in a start-up only when they’re confident the founder has the skills to lead it in the long term. Even these firms, though, have to replace as many as a quarter of the founder-CEOs in the companies they fund.
Rich-or-king choices can also crop up in established companies. One of my favorite examples comes from history. In 1917, Henry Royce was pushed to merge Rolls-Royce with Vickers, a large armaments manufacturer, in order to form a stronger British company. In a chapter in Creating Modern Capitalism, Peter Botticelli records Royce’s reaction: “From a personal point of view, I prefer to be absolute boss over my own department (even if it was extremely small) rather than to be associated with a much larger technical department over which I had only joint control.” Royce wanted control—not money.
Heads of not-for-profit organizations must make similar choices. I recently consulted with a successful Virginia-based nonprofit whose founder-CEO had faced two coup attempts. Early on, a hospital executive who felt he was himself more qualified to lead the organization mounted one takeover bid, and some years later, a board member made the other bid when the venture was beginning to attract notice. The founder realized that if he continued to accept money from outside organizations, he would face more attempts to oust him. Now the question he and his family have to think through is whether to take less money from outside funders even though that means the venture will grow less quickly.
Would-be entrepreneurs can also apply the framework to judge the kind of ideas they should pursue. Those desiring control should restrict themselves to businesses where they already have the skills and contacts they need or where large amounts of capital aren’t required. They may also want to wait until late in their careers before setting up shop, after they have developed broader skills and accumulated some savings. Founders who want to become wealthy should be open to pursuing ideas that require resources. They can make the leap sooner because they won’t mind taking money from investors or depending on executives to manage their ventures.• • •
Choosing between money and power allows entrepreneurs to come to grips with what success means to them. Founders who want to manage empires will not believe they are successes if they lose control, even if they end up rich. Conversely, founders who understand that their goal is to amass wealth will not view themselves as failures when they step down from the top job. Once they realize why they are turning entrepreneur, founders must, as the old Chinese proverb says, “decide on three things at the start: the rules of the game, the stakes, and the quitting time.”
