Corruption
You get who you pay for
The economic case for bribery
Jun 2nd 2012 | from the print edition
Bribery would be less of a problem if it wasn’t also a solid investment. A new paper by Raghavendra Rau of Cambridge University and Yan Leung Cheung and Aris Stouraitis of the Hong Kong Baptist University examines 166 high-profile cases of bribery since 1971, covering payments made in 52 countries by firms listed on 20 different stockmarkets. Bribery offered an average return of 10-11 times the value of the bung paid out to win a contract, measured by the jump in stockmarket value when the contract was won. America’s Department of Justice found similarly high returns in cases it has prosecuted.
Returns depend on which officials are having their palms greased. Higher-ranking officials get bigger bribes not only in cash terms but also as a proportion of the value of the contracts they dish out, with heads of state securing up to 4.7% of the contract value compared with just 1.2% for low-ranking officials. Senior officials also capture more of the benefit from graft, typically taking over 50% of the returns from contracts they hand out; their subordinates capture just 20% of the value.
The size of bribes is also affected by the institutional set-up in each country. Cash bribes are bigger in poorer countries with larger armed forces and higher customs burdens. The authors suggest such countries typically have weaker institutions and less constrained government officials. Bribers pay more, both in cash terms and as a share of project value, when there is lower newspaper circulation at home.
Not all dirty money is spent equally well. The authors find that firms with better overall financial performance outperform in this area, too, getting better value for their bribes. Returns are also higher where overall levels of bribery are held down by greater disclosure and director liability, perhaps because such scrutiny deters entry into the bribe-paying market by other firms. The problem is getting caught. Another paper, by Jonathan Karpoff of the University of Washington, Scott Lee of Texas A&M University and Gerald Martin of American University, found that American firms facing bribery-enforcement action lose 9% of their market value, mostly because they have other problems with misrepresentation and fraud.
馬政府最清廉 所有改革都藏髒錢
司馬觀點:中共的雙規與雙開(江春男)
2012年05月30日
中國鐵道部長劉志軍,因腐敗被「雙規」後再「雙開」,然後移送司法機關,有人擔心貪腐會亡黨亡國,但中共喉舌《環球時報》認為,適度的腐敗是經濟潤滑劑,是可理解和容忍的,這文章被譏為曠世奇文。
反貪卻避談財產
大陸幾乎無官不貪,中共領導人每天都在大聲反貪,但是從來不敢公布自己財產,貪官前仆後繼,越捉越多,因為腐敗已制度化和全面化,沒有讓它發揮點潤滑作用,官做不大,事也做不了。
以「鐵老大」劉志軍為例,每年數百億預算,同時有好幾條鐵路施工,每年要完成幾百公里,其中的土地、技術、材料、機電、工程、營運,多大的利益、多複雜的官商關係,還有鐵道醫院、鐵道法院、鐵道警察和周邊企業,這是一個小王國,但是內部監督薄弱,外部監督闕如,不貪是違反人性的。
中共以黨治國,大官出事後以黨紀處理。先雙規,在規定時間和規定地點接受調查;再雙開,亦即開除黨職和公職,交給法院之前先定性定調,以減低政治衝擊。雖然也算是反貪,卻與法治無關,雙規雙開如能治腐敗,才是天下奇事。
中國社會有數不清的潛規則,官員薪水不高,但油水不少,政府有第二財政,官員有灰色收入,《環球時報》承認說,中國可能是當前亞洲「腐敗痛苦感」最突出的國家,但要根治貪污,不切實際,因為反腐敗不能「反」出來,也不能「改」出來。
須接受適度腐敗
言下之意是,中國的貪腐是無藥可救的,中國人必須接受適度腐敗。這話不好聽,何謂適度
?但不講官話,難得如此坦白。
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