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2013年9月27日 星期五

著名顧問公司難熬: 麥肯錫何去何從






麥肯錫不但為全球龍頭企業(和政府)提供建議,同時也率先提出了以下創新的概念:商業並不只是交易,而是項專業,這項專業靠的是強大腦力,而非產業知識或單純的常識。
不過,過去15年,麥肯錫的名聲亦接連遭逢重創。麥肯錫涉入了安隆風暴;2010年,麥肯錫的顧問庫瑪(Anil Kumar)承認將內線消息交給帆船避險基金的拉賈拉特南(Raj Rajaratnam);去年,前麥肯錫管理合夥人古普達(Rajat Gupta)亦因向拉賈拉特南提供內線消息而遭定罪。

專業服務企業越來越難熬。中型顧問公司已經陷入掙扎求生的困境,Monitor Group去年宣佈破產,Booz & Co和Roland Berger也非常擔心自身的未來。麥肯錫是否已開始走下坡?麥當諾(Duff McDonald)在新書《The Firm》中向麥肯錫的未來提出了嚴峻質疑,克里斯汀生(Clayton Christensen)在與兩位同事合寫的文章〈Consulting on the Cusp of Disruption〉中指出,策略顧問的世界即將被徹底顛覆。

麥肯錫的成功倚賴的是無可質疑的正直名聲,如果旗下顧問會散播機密,這家公司自然無法繼續為全球各大企業服務。麥當諾指出,麥肯錫的規模讓它無法避免庫瑪事件再次上演。如今麥肯錫擁有1,200名顧問,它必須繼續成長,但成長也會無可避免地危及它最重要的資產。
麥肯錫的成功亦倚賴其處於最潮流尖端的能力。但最近幾年,麥肯錫似乎是站上了錯誤的尖端。麥當諾指出,麥肯錫導致了石油、天然氣等基礎產業的「金融化」,卻沒有在網路經濟中扮演重要角色。商業的新王者是穿帽T的工程師,不是穿條紋西裝的企管碩士。
克 里斯汀生則是將焦點放在更廣大的主題:過去破壞其他產業的創新力量,現在正襲擊顧問產業。麥肯錫、波士頓顧問及貝恩這三大策略顧問公司,過去因為資訊不透 明而獲益。但克里斯汀生強調,如今光線已經透入了它們的魔法之中,現在的企業越來越有能力衡量結果,也比過去更有能力雇用專家:三大顧問公司目前擁有超過 5萬名的前員工。


三大顧問公司過去擅長將數項不同服務整合為高價的套裝服務,但現在的企業客戶再也不想為此付出高昂費用。克里斯汀生指出,低價競爭者正在侵蝕三大的業務;Eden McCallum靠自由接案人壓低成本,BeyondCore則是以巨量數據取代高昂的低階分析師。

麥肯錫顯然面臨比過去更困難的市場,但它也曾克服許多艱難挑戰,例如在1980年代,波士頓顧問和貝恩就曾搶走了麥肯錫的知識制高點。如今,麥肯錫正在修正部分古普達時代的問題,努力恢復其專業精神。

麥 肯錫還擁有人才和知識這兩項巨大資產。它召募聰明年輕人的能力無人能敵,它擁有令人忌妒的前員工網絡,而且許多人都很樂意受雇於老東家。2011年時,有 超過150名前麥肯錫員工,負責營運銷售額超過10億美元的企業。此外,麥肯錫數十年來大力投資於知識,擁有數量龐大的全球資本主義研究資料,規模恐怕沒 有任何組織能比得上。

比較小型的顧問公司或正許面臨破壞式創新的壓力,但麥肯錫卻擁有難以複製的顧問魔力,而且這方面的需求並未減少。全球 統治階級沉迷於地位又充滿不安全感,決策者害怕克里斯汀生口中的破壞力量。因此他們會向知名顧問尋求安心和肯定,而麥肯錫非常知道該如何利用這樣的心理作 用。如此一來就可以確保麥肯錫的未來,就算沒有人能證明麥肯錫的建議到底有沒有幫助,也無所謂。(黃維德譯)
©The Economist Newspaper Limited 2013
經濟學人英文原文

The Economist
Schumpeter
The future of the Firm
Sep 21st 2013 |From the print edition
McKinsey looks set to stay top of the heap in management consulting.
IT IS one of the engines of global capitalism. Not only does McKinsey provide advice to most of the world's leading companies (and governments). It also pioneered the idea that business is a profession rather than a mere trade—and a profession that thrives on raw brainpower more than specialist industry knowledge or plain old common sense.
Yet McKinsey's name has suffered a succession of blows in the past 15 years. The Firm, as it calls itself, was deeply involved in the Enron debacle: the energy company's boss, Jeff Skilling, was a McKinsey veteran who praised the consultancy for doing "God's work", and the McKinsey Quarterly published articles on Enron as enthusiastically as Hello! runs pieces about the Beckhams. In 2010 Anil Kumar, a McKinsey consultant, admitted passing inside information to Raj Rajaratnam of Galleon, a hedge fund. Last year Rajat Gupta, a former McKinsey managing partner, was also convicted of passing inside information to Mr Rajaratnam.
Life is getting tougher for professional-services firms. Midsized consultancies are already suffering: Monitor Group went bankrupt last year—Deloitte later bought it for $120m—and Booz & Co and Roland Berger are agonising about their futures. If the legal profession is anything to go by, worse is to come: Dewey & LeBoeuf collapsed last year after borrowing heavily in a dash for growth, and other elite law firms are struggling to win business.
So, are McKinsey's best days behind it? Two new publications offer some interesting answers. "The Firm", by Duff McDonald, is a generally admiring book that nevertheless asks hard questions about the organisation's future. "Consulting on the Cusp of Disruption", by Clayton Christensen and two colleagues, is a penetrating article in the October Harvard Business Review, arguing that the comfortable world of the strategy consultancies is about to be turned upside down.
McKinsey's success depends above all on an unimpeachable reputation for integrity. It cannot continue to serve most of the world's leading companies (including working simultaneously for competitors) if its consultants are willing to spill secrets. Mr McDonald argues that the firm's size makes it impossible to avoid repeats of the Kumar problem. It is now a giant factory with 1,200 consultants rather than the cosy club of old. The firm has to keep growing, not least to provide its partners with the $1.5m or so a year that they earn. But every time it grows it puts its most important asset at risk.
McKinsey's success also depends on its ability to remain at the cutting edge of business. But in recent years it has seemed to be on the wrong cutting edge. Mr McDonald points out that whereas McKinsey has led the "financialisation" of basic industries such as oil and gas, it has had little if any role in shaping the giants of the internet economy, such as Apple and Google. The new lords of business are engineers in hoodies, not MBAs in pinstripes.
Mr Christensen focuses on a bigger subject: how the forces that have disrupted so many other businesses, from steel to publishing, are disrupting consulting. The big three strategy consultants—the other two are the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) and Bain—are masters of opacity. But Mr Christensen argues that light is being let in on the magic. Companies are getting better at measuring results and demanding value for money. They also have access to more business expertise than ever before: the big three have more than 50,000 living alumni.
The big three have been masters at bundling lots of different services into a single, high-priced package. But clients no longer want to pay fat fees for a bit of strategic advice from a senior partner and a lot of humdrum work from neophytes. Mr Christensen says low-priced competitors are beginning to dismember the consultants' business. Eden McCallum cuts costs by deploying freelancers, most of whom once worked for the big three. BeyondCore replaces overpriced junior analysts with Big Data, crunching vast amounts of information to identify trends.
McKinsey clearly faces a more difficult market than it is used to. But it has overcome serious challenges before—such as in the 1980s, when it lost the intellectual high ground to BCG and then Bain before regaining it. The firm is fixing some of the problems from the Gupta era. It has elected two successive managing directors, Ian Davis and Dominic Barton, who have worked hard to restore its professional ethos. Mr Barton urges companies to embrace "long-term capitalism" rather than "quarterly capitalism" and corporate responsibility rather than financial engineering: the very opposite of the Enron-era McKinsey's gospel.
Old boys (and girls) everywhere
McKinsey also has two huge assets: talent and knowledge. It retains an unrivalled ability to recruit hundreds of clever young people and turn them into an army of problem-solving worker ants. It also has an enviable network of alumni, many of whom are happy to hire their old employer: in 2011 more than 150 ex-McKinseyites were running companies with more than $1 billion in annual sales. The firm has also invested heavily in knowledge for decades: perhaps no other organisation has as much interesting data on global capitalism.
Though lesser firms may be facing disruption, McKinsey dispenses a special sort of consultorial fairy-dust that is hard to replicate, and as much in demand as ever. The global ruling class is seized with a toxic combination of status-obsession and status-insecurity. Decision-makers also fear being swept away by one of Mr Christensen's disruptive forces. They seek constant reassurance and reaffirmation from prestigious institutions. McKinsey knows better than almost anyone how to exploit this peculiar mindset. That will guarantee the Firm a solid future, even if no one can prove that its advice actually does any good.
©The Economist Newspaper Limited 2013

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