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2009年2月2日 星期一

Bailouts for Bunglers

Bailouts for Bunglers


Published: February 1, 2009


Question: what happens if you lose vast amounts of other people’s money? Answer: you get a big gift from the federal government — but the president says some very harsh things about you before forking over the cash.

問:如果你虧掉他人的大筆錢,後果如何?答案:獲得來自聯邦政府的一份大禮。不過在給錢之前,總統會對你嚴聲斥責。


Am I being unfair? I hope so. But right now that’s what seems to be happening.

這麼說不公平嗎?但願如此。不過這似乎正是目前的局面。

說得清楚一點,我談的並不是歐巴馬政府創造就業機會,以及暫時大幅增加聯邦開支的計畫。這是正確的藥方。我說的是歐巴馬政府的金融體系拯救方案。它們逐漸有如典型的「檸檬共和國」*操演:如果出了任何差池,由納稅人承擔成本;如經證明對症下藥,股東與企業高層獲利。

*翻譯錯誤

Lemon socialism is a term for the practice in supposedly free market capitalist economies in which the government steps in to bailout or otherwise subsidize weak or failing firms.[1][2][3]

A government attempting to transition from capitalism to socialism by this method takes control of the worst industries — the "lemons" — first, which undermines such an approach.[4] Socialists socialize the losses while capitalists keep the profits.[5] Similarly, in post-Communist societies, nationalized industries which had the least capital with which to modernize are the last targets for privatization.[6] The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 has been cited as an example of lemon socialism.[7][8]



Just to be clear, I’m not talking about the Obama administration’s plan to support jobs and output with a large, temporary rise in federal spending, which is very much the right thing to do. I’m talking, instead, about the administration’s plans for a banking system rescue — plans that are shaping up as a classic exercise in “lemon socialism”: taxpayers bear the cost if things go wrong, but stockholders and executives get the benefits if things go right.

When I read recent remarks on financial policy by top Obama administration officials, I feel as if I’ve entered a time warp — as if it’s still 2005, Alan Greenspan is still the Maestro, and bankers are still heroes of capitalism.

“We have a financial system that is run by private shareholders, managed by private institutions, and we’d like to do our best to preserve that system,” says Timothy Geithner, the Treasury secretary — as he prepares to put taxpayers on the hook for that system’s immense losses.

Meanwhile, a Washington Post report based on administration sources says that Mr. Geithner and Lawrence Summers, President Obama’s top economic adviser, “think governments make poor bank managers” — as opposed, presumably, to the private-sector geniuses who managed to lose more than a trillion dollars in the space of a few years.

And this prejudice in favor of private control, even when the government is putting up all the money, seems to be warping the administration’s response to the financial crisis.

Now, something must be done to shore up the financial system. The chaos after Lehman Brothers failed showed that letting major financial institutions collapse can be very bad for the economy’s health. And a number of major institutions are dangerously close to the edge.

So banks need more capital. In normal times, banks raise capital by selling stock to private investors, who receive a share in the bank’s ownership in return. You might think, then, that if banks currently can’t or won’t raise enough capital from private investors, the government should do what a private investor would: provide capital in return for partial ownership.

But bank stocks are worth so little these days — Citigroup and Bank of America have a combined market value of only $52 billion — that the ownership wouldn’t be partial: pumping in enough taxpayer money to make the banks sound would, in effect, turn them into publicly owned enterprises.

My response to this prospect is: so? If taxpayers are footing the bill for rescuing the banks, why shouldn’t they get ownership, at least until private buyers can be found? But the Obama administration appears to be tying itself in knots to avoid this outcome.

If news reports are right, the bank rescue plan will contain two main elements: government purchases of some troubled bank assets and guarantees against losses on other assets. The guarantees would represent a big gift to bank stockholders; the purchases might not, if the price was fair — but prices would, The Financial Times reports, probably be based on “valuation models” rather than market prices, suggesting that the government would be making a big gift here, too.

And in return for what is likely to be a huge subsidy to stockholders, taxpayers will get, well, nothing.

Will there at least be limits on executive compensation, to prevent more of the rip-offs that have enraged the public? President Obama denounced Wall Street bonuses in his latest weekly address — but according to The Washington Post, “the administration is likely to refrain from imposing tougher restrictions on executive compensation at most firms receiving government aid” because “harsh limits could discourage some firms from asking for aid.” This suggests that Mr. Obama’s tough talk is just for show.

Meanwhile, Wall Street’s culture of excess seems to have been barely dented by the crisis. “Say I’m a banker and I created $30 million. I should get a part of that,” one banker told The New York Times. And if you’re a banker and you destroyed $30 billion? Uncle Sam to the rescue!

There’s more at stake here than fairness, although that matters too. Saving the economy is going to be very expensive: that $800 billion stimulus plan is probably just a down payment, and rescuing the financial system, even if it’s done right, is going to cost hundreds of billions more. We can’t afford to squander money giving huge windfalls to banks and their executives, merely to preserve the illusion of private ownership.



這種即使在政府大手筆金援下,仍然偏好民間掌理的偏見似乎已經扭曲政府對金融危機的反應方式。

如今,當局必須以具體措施扶助金融體系。雷曼兄弟倒閉後出現的亂局顯示,任由大型金融機構倒閉可能有害經濟的健全。為數不少的大型機構已經瀕臨危險邊緣。

因此,銀行需要更多的資金。在正常的時期,銀行為籌措資金而向民間投資人出售股份,投資人則取得銀行的股份。你可能會認為,如果銀行無法或不可能自民間投資人手中籌得足夠的資金,政府必須代替民間投資人的角色:提供資金,換取部分所有權。

癥結是,最近這一段時間以來,銀行的股票價值已經所剩無幾;花旗集團與美國銀行的市場值合計約僅520億美元。在這種局面下,所有權不可能局部化。事實上,以足夠的納稅人血汗錢使銀行恢復健全體質將使它們變成公有事業。

我對這種可能性的回答是:怎麼樣?如果納稅人為拯救銀行的方案買單,他們為什麼不能取得所有權,至少直到民間買家出現?然而歐巴馬政府似乎為了避免這種後果而自縛手腳。

如果新聞報導無誤,銀行拯救方案將包括兩個主要部分:政府購入部分有問題的銀行資產,並擔保其他資產的損失。擔保有如對銀行股東的大禮。金融時報報導,如果價格合理,購入不是大禮,價格才是,而且可能以「估價模式」而不是市場價格為基礎。這意味,政府也會送出大禮。

政府可能大手筆補貼股東,納稅人獲得的回報是:零。

能否至少限制機構高層的薪資上限,以免惹惱社會大眾的偷竊事件再度上演?歐巴馬總統在最近一次的每周演說中痛批華爾街高層坐領優渥薪酬,然而根據華盛頓郵 報的說法,「歐巴馬政府可能不會從嚴限制多數接受政府援助的企業高層薪酬」,因為「從嚴限制可能導致部分企業不敢開口求援」。這意味,歐巴馬的嚴厲談話只 是說說而已。

另外,華爾街操之過甚的文化似乎並未因為這次的危機而有任何改變。一名銀行家向紐約時報表示:「如果我是銀行家,憑空創造3000萬美元,則我應該分得一份。」如果你是銀行家,並使300億美元憑空消失?山姆大叔來救你了!

雖然公平很重要,問題卻不只牽涉到公平的原則。救經濟必然花費甚鉅:8000億美元的刺激方案可能只是頭期款;即使操作正確,拯救金融體系勢必得投入更多資金。

我們不能只是為了維持私有權的幻想而把錢浪擲於為銀行及其高層提供鉅額的意外之財。

(作者Paul Krugman是紐約時報專欄作家/陳世欽譯)

【2009/02/03 經濟日報】@ http://udn.com/

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