Sharp chose to stay domestic when all the action was global; it did not protect its intellectual property sufficiently; it failed to make the right alliances; it did not prioritize and it still makes far too many diverse products. http://s.nikkei.com/1PFsq8q
The island’s electronics firms are in need of an upgrade
... Of all the countries dependent on purchases by China, Taiwan has most to lose as the mainland’s electronics industry becomes more self-sufficient, says Angela Hsieh, an economist at Barclays, a bank. South Korea also depends on China, but its firms sell a wider variety of goods there, such as cars and cosmetics.
Becoming more innovative is easier for some than others. Hon Hai, which has its eye on Sharp’s research into advanced OLED display screens, is big enough to absorb the struggling Japanese firm, and to keep throwing money at developing its technology. Likewise, South Korean firms such as Samsung Electronics, which belong to giant conglomerates, can afford the R&D and marketing budgets needed to remain globally competitive. But many of Taiwan’s electronics firms are, thus far at least, small, anonymous links in other companies’ supply chains.
Starting to sell gadgets under their own brands might offer these firms far higher profit margins, allowing them to pull themselves up by their bootstraps. But past experience shows that it is hard to do this without going into competition with the more famous customers that they rely on. Some Taiwanese firms, including HTC and Asus, have produced branded products—such as phones and notebook computers—only to be deserted by the customers to whom they sell components.
Raymond Hsu, an analyst with Taiwan Ratings, an affiliate of Standard and Poor’s, thinks Hon Hai would only try to make money from Sharp’s brand if it could attach it to products that wouldn’t upset its existing customers. The Taiwanese firm may be more interested, in the short term, in being able to offer brand-owners like Apple a wider range of components, and thus to increase its bargaining-power with them. Mr Hsu says Apple would prefer not to buy OLED displays from Samsung, which is a rival producer of smartphones.
Taiwan’s president-elect, Tsai Ing-wen, has promised to reshape its economy by “shifting from an efficiency-driven model to an innovation-driven one.” Ms Tsai also wants to reduce reliance on China and promote greater technology ties with America and Japan. The question is how. Taiwanese firms have already been encouraged by the outgoing government to flirt with the likes of cloud computing, the “internet of things”, 3D printing, biotechnology and renewable energy. Some are showing potential, but there will be no quick fixes. Meanwhile, prospering rivals on the mainland enjoy the benefits of a vast home market, and a government with lots more money to throw around.
Mr. David B. Marsing serves as Chief Operating Officer of Eagle Harbor Holdings, LLC (EHH). ... Mr. Marsing was an Executive for 23-years with Intel Corp.
1995.10.31 Killer Results Without Killing Yourself | Fast Company ... At 36, Intel's David Marsing suffered a near-fatal heart attack. Now he's running the world's largest semi-conductor factory — and trying to save Intel from itself.
Peter Senge 等4人合著【修練的軌跡】天下文化，2006，pp.192-94--這大概根據上文寫的故事，強調 David Marsing管理最大工廠的回報率很高
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Valeant_Pharmaceuticals An important part of the growth strategy for Valeant has been acquisitions, sometimes in the multibillion-dollar range, of medical and pharmaceutical companies.[9] As of July 2015, the company was valued at over $90 billion USD ($116 billion CAD) by market capitalization, making it the largest public company in Canada[10] and the largest pharmaceutical company in the nation.[6] By October 2015 Valeant's stock price had dropped to just less than $72.60 USD (approximately $126 CAD), giving a market capitalisation of $24.77 billion USD ($43 billion CAD). This represents a decrease of approximately 80% since the July high. In November 2015, the continued fall in the stock's price resulted in a $100M margin call and forced sale of the stock by the company's CEO J. Michael Pearson. By December 29, 2015 shares fell "10.5 percent to $102.14" on the New York Stock Exchange[11] as Valeant's board of directors handed the duties of CEO J. Michael Pearson, who was hospitalized with severe pneumonia, to a group of executives overseen by a committee.[11][11][12][13][14] On January 6, 2015, Valeant named Howard B. Schiller interim chief executive.[15] Valeant's debt reached roughly $30 billion by 2016 due largely to acquisitions.[16] By March 4, 2016, Valeant's stock price had fallen intraday below $60/share resulting in a market capitalization of $20 billion, a $60 billion loss in market capitalization in 6 months. On March 15 the stock tumbled by over 45% due to a weaker outlook for 2016 and risked breaching some debt agreements. This sent the stock to a new low of $33.01 per share – giving the company a capitalization of less than $11.3 billion.[17]
UNTIL recently, America hadn’t had a spectacular corporate disaster since Lehman Brothers in 2008. But Valeant, a Canadian but New York-listed drug firm, now meets all of the tests: a bad business model, accounting problems, acquisitions, debt, an oddly low tax rate, a weak board, credulous analysts, and managers with huge pay packets and a mentality of denial. The result has been a $75 billion loss for shareholders and, possibly, a default on $31 billion of debt.
Valeant’s business model was buying other drug firms, cutting costs and yanking up prices. Since 2010 it has done $35 billion of deals, mainly financed by debt. At a time when Americans face stagnant living standards, a strategy based on squeezing customers was bound to encounter political hostility—“I’m going after them,” Hillary Clinton has vowed.
Valeant added to this mix a tendency towards evasiveness. In October investigative reporters revealed its murky relationship with a drugs dispensary, Philidor, which it consolidated into its accounts yet did not control. The relationship was severed but the Securities and Exchange Commission is still investigating. Federal prosecutors are also looking into various of the company’s practices. On Christmas Eve Michael Pearson, Valeant’s CEO and architect, went into hospital with pneumonia. On February 28th Mr Pearson (total pay awarded of $55m since 2012, according to Bloomberg) returned to work, welcomed back by the chairman for his “vision and execution”.
The facts that have emerged in March suggest that Mr Pearson should have been fired. Profit targets have been cut by 24% compared with October’s. The accounts will be restated and the filing of an annual report delayed. The results released on March 15th contain neither a full cash-flow statement nor a balance-sheet, but it appears that Valeant has been generating only just enough cash to pay its $1.6 billion interest bill this year. As suppliers and customers get wary, its cashflow may fall, leading to a default.
There are three lessons. First, boards matter: the managers should have been removed in October. Second, disasters happen in plain sight. Valeant issued $1.45 billion of shares in March 2015, when 90% of Wall Street analysts covering its shares rated them a “buy”. Yet as early as 2014 a rival firm, Allergan, had made an outspoken attack on Valeant’s finances, the thrust of which has been proved correct.
The final lesson is that “activist” investors, who aim to play a hands-on role at the firms that they invest in, have no monopoly on wisdom. Jeffrey Ubben of ValueAct and Bill Ackman of Pershing Square both own chunks of Valeant and have supported it. Mr Ackman is at present trying to consolidate America’s railway system. Mr Ubben is trying to shake up Rolls-Royce, a British aerospace firm. After Valeant, why should anyone listen to what they say?
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Drug firm Valeant's fall shows why boards matter—and that hands-on investors have no monopoly on wisdom
Teams are as old as civilisation: even Jesus had 12 co-workers. But in the age of open-plan offices and social networks, some work is still best left to the individual
Valeant added to this mix a tendency towards evasiveness. In October investigative reporters revealed its murky relationship with a drugs dispensary, Philidor, which it consolidated into its accounts yet did not control. The relationship was severed but the Securities and Exchange Commission is still investigating. Federal prosecutors are also looking into various of the company’s practices. On Christmas Eve Michael Pearson, Valeant’s CEO and architect, went into hospital with pneumonia. On February 28th Mr Pearson (total pay awarded of $55m since 2012, according to Bloomberg) returned to work, welcomed back by the chairman for his “vision and execution”.
