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2012年3月30日 星期五

質疑補償基金會預算合理性,及其違法延長事宜

轉型正義週訊          No.179 (2012/3/30)   
*財訊雜誌報導質疑補償基金會預算合理性,及其違法延長事宜
說明:對政治受難者的補償是台灣少數進行的轉型正義工作之一,補償基金會的工作格外需要社會共同監督與關心。
一個月只辦九個案子 工友年領八十萬
白色恐怖補償基金會超級大肥缺
作者:田習如 出處:節錄自財訊雜誌第395期(2012/3/25出刊)
管理兩百億元的公帑,享有比公務員優惠的薪資,福利比照軍公教,資遣比照《勞基法》,行政績效不彰,有法定存續期卻數次爭取延長,對民眾公開的資訊少得可憐……這麼「好混」的地方在哪裡?
有 一個公家機構,法定工作應該在今年三月八日結束,扣除春節等假期後,有四十四天上班日,再扣掉八天「謀職假」,今年實際只要上班三十六天,所有員工便可獲得以下收入:兩個月又八天的薪水、一.九個月的年終工作獎金、兩個月或一個半月的考績獎金、兩個月又八天的交通津貼(雙北市每月兩千元,其他縣市三千 元)、每人一萬六千元旅遊補助或相當於二十八天薪資的不休假獎金,以及一筆豐厚的「資遣費」。
執行長比國防部長「好賺」
算一算,根據前述為期不到三個月的預算書,這個機構最高薪的執行長就可以領二五萬元以上,最低薪的工友也可以領近一百萬元。
這是由國防部捐助二三億元成立的「戒嚴時期不當叛亂暨匪諜審判案件補償基金會」,主要工作就是認定並發放白色恐怖下的冤獄補償金。補償基金會執行長的月薪約十七萬元,僅略低於其「老闆」國防部長高華柱的薪資,而且還有特別費,原本每月四.五萬元,只比國防部長少一些,後來經立法院糾正才降為每月二.五萬 元;該基金會工友的月薪五.二萬元,也比一般政府機關的工友高出許多。
為了平反並補償威權統治時期政治受難家庭的損失,立法院先是在一九 九五年通過《二二八事件處理及補償條例》,接著在九八年通過針對戒嚴時期政治性審判案件的補償條例,並由當年白色恐怖主要「打手」之一的國防部「將功折」,捐助成立補償基金會,再由該基金會根據國防部、法務部和內政部清查移交的案件,核定、發放補償金給政治受難者或其家屬。
「這筆錢是要給受害人家屬,用不完就該交還給國庫,但基金會成立後卻好像把它當成一塊肥肉,讓特定的一群人吃香喝辣。」立委尤美女批評補償基金會的專職人員薪資、福利過高,績效卻太差,「二十六個員工,平均一個月才收案九件,而且處理案件逐年減少,照理該逐年減薪、精簡人事,但每年人事行政費用卻還花掉六千多萬元!」
尤美女舉出該會的薪級表,顯示其職員近八年薪資漲幅從執行長的三%到工友的六八%,相當驚人,比起十年來調薪兩次、漲幅共六%的公務員,以及主計處才公佈的民間勞工平均薪資水準倒退十四年,更顯得離譜。
從補償基金會的業務統計可知,處理補償案件的高峰期是從成立時的一九九九年到二○○三年,當時每年都通過一千多件申請案,後來案量大幅減少,行政資源卻未相應精簡。
事實上,補償基金會最初訂立的捐助章程,便因應白色恐怖補償條例的規定而設有落日條款,補償條例原規定的受害人申請補償期限,從兩年一路修法延長為四年、八年、十二年,補償基金會的存續期間也延長到今年三月八日截止。不過,近年該基金會賣力找尋各方勢力協助設法與補償條例脫鉤,以免一再需要看立法院的臉色修法,去年七月更在基金會董事之一的總統馬英九「國師」王曉波帶領下,找上時任閣揆吳敦義,尋求「永續發展」之道,獲得擅長修辭的吳揆一長串「若有似無」的肯定。
案量減少 資源卻未精簡
本刊在三月中旬實地走訪補償基金會,發現該會並未解散,出面說明的行政處長陳英明表示,他們在三月七日晚上拿到國防部同意該會修改章程「再延兩年」的公文。他並強調該會還負有「人權教化、撫慰傷痛」的政治任務,因此並不是辦完補償案件就該結束。
尤美女質疑,該基金會多年來用被動的方式等待政治受難人來申請補償,直到解散期限將屆,才找出一堆未及認定的潛在案件,以保障人權為由要求延任,「簡直像在綁架政府,假借正義之名,掩蓋肥缺之實。」(完整版請看395期財訊雜誌)

    對於「真相」政府應有國際觀(蘇慧婕、葉虹靈)
說明:本文節錄版曾刊登於2012/3/25自由時報,此為完整版。
聯合國將324日訂為「瞭解嚴重侵犯人權行為真相權利和維護受害者尊嚴國際日」,聯合國人權理事會強調,瞭解真相對受害者、家屬或社會的重要性,並直指這是不可剝奪、不應受到限制的權利。但從我國檔案管理局對政治案件檔案的保守作法看來,台灣顯然自外於國際潮流,馬政府寧使檔案塵封,也不讓社會追求真相。
近年來民間多次呼籲,檔案局應放寬政治案件檔案使用,尤其是影響理解案情至鉅的筆錄、自白書等,對當於事人、家屬、研究者要瞭解全案脈絡及拼湊案情,有無可取代的重要性,但檔案局屢以維護第三人權益為由,拒絕外界申請。儘管去年開始,檔案局數次邀集專家學者討論,但當大多數與會者都要求檔案局應以追求歷史真 相之公共利益為重,不應限縮解釋法條時,檔案局仍躊躇不前。在今年初又以委外研究比較各國情況之拖延手法,讓修法看來遙遙無期。我們不知道絕大多數已近凋零的政治受難者,是否來得及一睹歷史真相;也不知道亟需檔案搭配訪談受難者進行研究的學術界,該被檔案局的官僚主義拖延多久?
以全世界對威 權統治的政治案件檔案,規範最為詳盡的德國為例,德國將前東德國安部文件明確排除在適用於一般國家檔案的《聯邦檔案法》之外,另行制訂《前東德國安部文件法》。目的在妥善因應國安部文件作為「東德威權統治時期之政府行為記錄」,其意義乃在「銘記、反省那段不公義的歷史,並且教育、警示未來世代」的特殊性 質。故在歷史真相公開與反省,和第三人隱私權之間,採行「階段式的隱私權保障」:將受難者、家屬的知情權,以及歷史研究所追求的轉型正義法益,置於國安部人員與民間線人的隱私權之前。
而當涉及被違法監控者的隱私權時,若其具有「時代性意義、政治權力或公職身分」,則檔案原則上可公開;若只是一般民眾,僅能在獲得當事人書面同意、當事人死後30年(卒年難以查證時以出生後110年計算),或匿名措施與學術研究目的不符時,方能公開。檔案公開之職權,則交由慣例上以民權人士為首的獨立機關行使。歷經納粹慘痛歷史的德國,透過精細的機關與法益衡量設計,力求在隱私權保障的前提下,確保德國人能回顧 那不堪的威權歷史,以警惕德國人民:Never Again
反觀臺灣,政府並未意識到威權統治時期檔案的特殊性質,而將白色恐怖檔案一體適用《檔案法》。 更甚者,與德國力求調和歷史反省和隱私權保障的努力背反,檔案局以「隱私權保障」之名,遂行曲解檔案法第1822條,並以政府資訊公開法和個人資料保護 法等普通法,反過來限制檔案法之特別法等違背法理之實,無視受難者、家屬的知情權和轉型正義的重大法益。我國相關法制不但落後於德國,也與聯合國推動「瞭解真相權利」的方向背道而馳,對於屢以簽署聯合國兩公約為人權政績的馬總統,堪稱一大諷刺。
《前東德國安部文件法》施行已屆二十年,共受理逾668萬份的檔案公開申請,而臺灣的受難者家屬和歷史研究者,在解嚴已逾25的今日,仍然受困在歷史未知的迷霧中,無從正視創傷,也無法開始療癒。無 怪乎日前有資深研究者在學術會議上感嘆,檔案局彷彿淪為僅有保管作用的倉庫,還不如趁著政府組織再造,進行人力精簡,僅聘僱保全看守檔案庫即可,以免浪費納稅人的血汗錢。(蘇慧婕為台灣民間真相與和解促進會監事、德國海德堡大學法學博士,葉虹靈為促進會執行長)
*更多轉型正義相關資訊,請上本會網站www.taiwantrc.org

2012年3月29日 星期四

significant issues: Foxconn Violates China's Labor Laws - Audit


Apple Supplier Foxconn Violates China's Labor Laws - Audit


部調查發現﹐蘋果公司(Apple Inc.)最大供應商的中國工廠存在多起平均工作時長超過每周60小時的情況﹐並存在健康和安全問題。這家供應商已經同意調整用工制度。

Apple/Reuters
週二﹐蘋果CEO庫克(穿黃色衣服者)參觀了富士康一家工廠。
這 次針對製造商鴻海精密工業股份有限公司(Hon Hai Precision Industry Co.﹐亦稱富士康(Foxconn))的審計是由美國公平勞工協會(Fair Labor Association)進行的﹐這也是調查蘋果供應鏈中侵犯勞工權益情況所取得的最新進展。

審計的部分依據是對深圳和成都三家富士康工廠35,500名生產iPod和iPhone等產品的工人所做的訪問。這次審計是經蘋果申請進行的。蘋果自己進行的審計也曾發現存在類似的問題。

這是迄今為止針對中國製造企業的用工情況所進行的最詳盡的調查之一﹐也是針對蘋果供應鏈進行的第一次外部調查。據公平勞工協會的報告﹐這家非盈利組織發現至少有50處違背法律或守則、或公司政策存在欠缺的地方。這些發現促使富士康和蘋果同意推出新的改革舉措。

總部位於加州庫珀蒂諾的蘋果發表聲明說﹐完全支持公平勞工協會的建議。聲明說﹐我們認為賦權於工人、幫助他們理解自己的權利是至關重要的。聲明還表示﹐蘋果多年來一直在為解決這些問題而努力。

富士康發表聲明說﹐它將與蘋果一道解決公平勞工協會提出的問題﹐並曾全面、開放地參與這次評估。聲明說﹐員工是我們最具價值的資產﹐我們全心全意地致力於確保他們擁有安全、滿意和健康的工作環境。

公平勞工協會發現﹐過去12個月的某些時間里﹐三家工廠的平均工作時間超過每星期60小時﹐高於公平勞工協會守則和蘋果內部準則的規定。調查發現﹐過去一年中的幾個月﹐多數工人的加班時間都超出了中國法律規定的每月36個小時的上限。

該 協會說﹐富士康同意在2013年7月之前將工人工作時間降到中國法律規定的每周40小時的上限之內﹐並把加班時間降到每月36小時的上限之內。這將要求富 士康把加班時間削減一半以上﹐因為報告認定現在的加班時間達到了一個月80小時。公平勞工協會說﹐要實現這個目標富士康就得再招數萬名工人。

公平勞工協會主席兼首席執行長范希爾登(Auret van Heerden)在接受採訪時說﹐富士康做出的縮短加班時間的承諾為全行業樹立了一個榜樣﹐並且將向其他企業證明縮短加班時間是可以做到的。

他還補充說﹐這些調查結果顯示﹐富士康和中國其他工廠的情況一樣糟。

公平勞工協會有34個成員機構﹐其中包括耐克(Nike Inc.)等在華開展業務的服裝公司。范希爾登說﹐此次調查是該協會迄今為止在中國進行的最詳盡的一次調查。他說﹐該協會將繼續關注富士康的進展情況﹐並定期公佈最新檢查結果。

調查問卷所針對的主要問題也是倡導工人權益的批評者所針對的問題﹐蘋果近幾個月來一直在加大力度為自己辯護。最近﹐這家科技巨頭自己的年度審計發現存在僱傭童工、超長時間工作和安全保護不力等問題。

今年1月﹐蘋果公佈了一份報告﹐報告中說﹐去年只有38%的供應商達到了每周最多工作60小時、每七天至少休息一天的標準。最近蘋果說﹐今年2月對供應鏈上50萬名工人中的89%進行的調查顯示﹐工作時間符合規定。

蘋果首席執行長庫克(Tim Cook)說﹐該公司致力於改善工人的工作條件﹐並已經開始更細緻地監督工作條件﹐特別是工作時間。本週﹐庫克到中國與高層政府官員進行了會談﹐同時參觀了富士康鄭州工廠的一條iPhone組裝線。

范希爾登說﹐公平勞工協會的調查比蘋果自己的調查還要全面徹底。蘋果自己的調查意在評估工作條件是否符合某些具體規定。

公平勞工協會的調查從2月中旬開始﹐為期三週。該協會發現﹐富士康工廠存在多項健康和安全問題﹐比如風險分析不足以及缺乏保護工人免受高溫影響的系統。有43%以上的工人反饋稱曾經歷或目睹過事故。報告說﹐有相當多的工人在健康和安全方面感覺沒有保障。

公平勞工協會還發現﹐工人加班沒有得到合理的補償。該協會說﹐富士康和蘋果也承諾會解決這個問題。

該協會通過調查發現﹐約有三分之二的工人為男性﹐平均年齡為23歲。這些調查是在iPad和電腦上進行的。

在評估工人情緒方面﹐報告說﹐有48%的受訪者認為工作時間合理﹐而有17.7%的工人認為工作時間過長。約有33.8%的工人希望延長工作時間以便掙更多的錢﹐而有64.3%的工人認為工資不足以滿足基本需要。

JESSICA E. VASCELLARO

2012年3月28日 星期三

Chinese airline profits hit by dispute over oil hedging

故事背景是3年前中國某代表在新加坡作原油期貨被痛殺
損失慘重
他們一朝被蛇咬......


中国航空业因“退保”蒙受损失

Chinese airline profits hit by dispute over oil hedging




A dispute with international banks has cost Chinese airlines dearly as they have been flying for much of the past year without insurance against surging oil prices.
中国航空业因为与国际银行之间存在的争议而付出了高昂代价。在过去一年的大部分时间里,它们都在没有针对油价暴涨的保险的情况下运营。
Profits at two of the country’s biggest airlines have fallen sharply as a result, providing an example of how too much risk aversion in Beijing’s management of the economy can itself be risky.
结果,中国两家最大的航空公司的利润大幅下滑。这表明中国政府在经济管理中过于规避风险的做法本身,也具有极大风险。
Three years ago the Chinese government barred airlines from buying crude future contracts – an essential form of protection against rising fuel costs.
3年前,中国政府禁止航空公司购买原油期货合约。这种期货合约是抵御燃油成本上涨的一种保护方式。
This hardline stance was based on the view that the airlines had been duped by western bankers when they suffered big losses in 2008 after the value of their crude futures collapsed alongside the price of oil during the global financial crisis.
中国政府立场强硬的理由是,全球金融危机期间,中国各大航空公司购买的原油期货的价值与油价一同暴跌,导致2008年损失惨重,中国政府因此认为这些航空公司被西方银行业愚弄了。
Airlines sought to claw back some of their losses from the banks, alleging that they had been “maliciously” sold hedging products that were overly complex.
这些航空公司曾试图从那些银行得到部分补偿,指责这些银行向它们“恶意”出售过于复杂的对冲产品。
Since then the airlines have let their existing hedging arrangement expire and have not entered any new ones, according to financial statements published this week by Air China and China Eastern Airlines.
本周中国国际航空公司(Air China)和中国东方航空公司(China Eastern Airlines)发布的财报显示,自那以后,航空公司在手中的对冲合约到期后,没有购买任何新的对冲产品。
“All the contracts signed in past years were settled by 31 December 2011,” China Eastern disclosed in its full-year results. Air China said: “As at 31 December 2011, the fuel derivative contracts of the company all expired, and no new position has been established.”
东航在年报中披露道:“以往年度签署的合约于2011年12月31日前交割完毕。”国航表示:“截至2011年12月31日,公司的油料衍生合同全部到期,并且没有购买新的头寸。”
That lack of protection against oil prices has made them extremely vulnerable.
由于没有抵御油价暴涨的措施,这些航空公司很容易蒙受损失。
Air China’s jet fuel costs were Rmb34.7bn ($5.5bn) last year, accounting for nearly 38 per cent of overall expenses. Its hedging positions – holdovers from before the ban – allowed it to recoup a mere 0.2 per cent of those costs. Typically, airlines try to hedge about a third of their fuel bills.
去年国航的航空油料成本是347亿元人民币(合55亿美元),占总经营费用的近38%。其持有的对冲头寸——来自禁令发布之前——仅仅弥补了其中0.2%的成本。通常航空公司会试图对大约三分之一的油料成本进行对冲。
Air China’s 2011 profits fell 38.8 per cent to Rmb7.5bn, worse than expected. China Eastern’s profits last year were down 9.1 per cent to Rmb4.9bn and it posted a loss in the fourth quarter.
2011年国航的利润下降了38.8%,至75亿元人民币,比预期糟糕。去年东航的利润下降了9.1%,至49亿元人民币,第四季度出现亏损。
“As an airline, rising crude costs are what we most dislike seeing,” Liu Shaoyong, China Eastern chairman, told the Financial Times.
东航董事长刘绍勇向英国《金融时报》表示:“航空公司最不愿意看到的就是原油成本上涨。”
Regulators have not announced a change in their futures policy, but Mr Liu said that they were beginning to row back from a blanket prohibition on hedging.
中国监管机构尚未宣布期货政策方面的任何改变,不过刘绍勇表示,监管机构正在开始放松全面禁止对冲的做法。
“They have given us permission to buy hedging contracts for jet fuel. These will be about 20 per cent of our overall [fuel cost],” Mr Liu said.
刘绍勇表示:“监管机构已经允许我们购买航空油料对冲合约。这将覆盖我们全部(油料成本)的20%。”

译者/倪卫国

2012年3月26日 星期一

( transaction costs )Charity begins… in the back office




交易成本值得花
Charity begins… in the back office




You’re a generous person, I can tell. But how much do you think about the effectiveness of your charitable donations? One handy way to size up a charity is to pay attention to how much money it spends on overheads such as administration and fundraising, rather than frontline do-gooding. There’s only one small problem: this ready reckoner is enormously misleading.
我能看出来你是个慷慨的人。不过,你觉得自己捐出的善款,使用效率有多高?衡量一家慈善机构,一个简便的计算方法是考虑它有多少钱花费在了经营中,如行政管理和筹款,而不是用在第一线帮助他人。可惜有一个小小的问题:这种简便的计算方式具有极强的误导性。
For people who think about the effectiveness of charities, this insight is not news. Givewell, a charity that evaluates the effectiveness of other charities, complained five years ago about the “pervasive attitude that nonprofits need to get all their money right to the needy, and do all their administration on the cheap”. Dean Karlan, an economics professor and co-author of More Than Good Intentions, analysed Givewell’s recommendations and found that outstanding charities tended to spend more money, not less, on administration and fundraising.
对于研究慈善机构效率的人而言,这种见解并不新鲜。研究其他慈善机构效率的公益组织 Givewell五年前就曾抱怨过,“一种普遍的看法是,非盈利组织应该把所有的钱都直接交给需要帮助的人,它们所有的行政工作都应当尽量少花钱。”《有 好意还不够》(More Than Good Intentions)一书的合著者、经济学教授迪安•卡兰(Dean Karlan)对Givewell的建议做过分析,他发现出色的慈善机构在行政管理和筹资方面的开支往往更多,而不是更少。
Caroline Fiennes, author of a new book, It Ain’t What You Give, It’s The Way That You Give It, explains that fundraising costs tend to be determined by donors – who can generous or stingy, ignorant of the cause or conscious of it. Meanwhile, administration costs could include efficient logistics, accounting or purchasing systems – plus paying for rigorous evaluation.
新书《重点不是你给了什么,重点是你给的方式》(It Ain't What You Give, It's The Way That You Give It)的作者卡罗琳•法因斯(Caroline Fiennes)解释道,筹资成本通常是由捐助者决定的——他们可能慷慨也可能吝啬,可能不了解筹款用途也可能了解。同时,行政成本中可能包括高效的物 流、会计或采购系统,此外还要花钱进行严格的评估。
It isn’t just in the world of charitable giving that we pay too much attention to administrative costs. Government ministers of all stripes love to claim that they will cut bureaucracy, sacking administrators and managers and investing the savings in “teachers and nurses”. If your child’s school is closed for a day or so because the heating fails, or your operation is cancelled due to lack of surgical supplies, then you can at least console yourself that those pesky administrative costs are being thoroughly squeezed.
我们其实不只是在慈善捐助领域过于关注行政成本。各种政治立场的政府官员们都喜欢宣称自己会精 简机构,裁减行政人员和管理人员,将省下来的经费投入到“教师和护士”身上。如果您的孩子的学校因为供暖故障而停课一两天,或者您的手术因为缺少手术用具 而取消,那么您至少还可以安慰自己:毕竟那些讨厌的行政成本已经被完全消除了。
The truth is that in the modern world, a surprising amount of money is spent on what one might call transaction costs. One definition of a transaction cost is any cost that Robinson Crusoe could never conceivably have faced. Costs of processing trades, searching for bargains, standing in line and suing for breach of contract are all transaction costs. So, arguably, are the costs of maintaining accounts and filing (or avoiding) taxes.
事实上,在现代世界,花在所谓“交易成本”中的钱,多得令人惊讶。交易成本有一个这样的定义: 它是鲁宾逊•克鲁索(Robinson Crusoe)无论如何都不可能遇到的成本。进行贸易、寻找廉价商品、排队、起诉对方违约的花销,都属于交易成本。按理说,做账、报税(或避税)的成本也 属于交易成本。
John J. Wallis and Douglass North, in a book chapter published in 1986, tried to estimate the importance of transaction costs in the US economy between 1870 and 1970. For simplicity, Wallis and North tried to define whole job categories devoted to supporting transactions (these include managers, sales assistants, lawyers, police and accountants) and also sections of the economy, such as retail, which were almost entirely devoted to supporting transactions.
约翰•沃利斯(John Wallis)和道格拉斯•诺斯(Douglass North)在1986年出版的一本书中的一个章节里,试着估算了1870年至1970年之间交易成本在美国经济中的重要性。为了简单起见,沃利斯和诺斯 尝试对所有专门提供交易服务的工作种类(包括经理、销售助理、律师、警察和会计师)、以及几乎完全专门提供交易服务的行业(如零售业)进行了定义。
Wallis and North reckoned that the production of the economy devoted to transaction services had more than doubled over the century, from 26 per cent of gross national product in 1870 to 55 per cent of GNP in 1970. Public sector transaction spending had grown especially rapidly, but from a low base, and the lion’s share of transaction costs remained in the private sector: a total of over 40 per cent of GNP – an awful lot of administrators. All waste? Surely, the story is a continuation of what Adam Smith identified back in 1776: increasing productive power thanks to specialisation and the division of labour. A subsistence farmer may have overheads, but he needs few transaction services. A modern city-dweller, who continually does business with strangers, lives and breathes them.
沃利斯和诺斯估算到,整体经济中专门提供交易服务的那些部分的产出占国民生产总值(GNP)的 比例,从1870年的26%提高到了1970年的55%。公共部门交易支出的增长尤其迅猛,但由于起点较低,交易成本的大头仍然在私人部门:总额与GNP 之比超过40%——行政人员多得不像话。这些成本是不是都属于一种浪费?可以肯定的是,这个问题与亚当•斯密(Adam Smith)早在1776年就发现的问题是一脉相承的:专业化和劳动分工促进了生产力的提高。自给自足的农民可能也有经营成本,但他需要的交易服务很少。 一个现代的城市人,需要不断地与陌生人打交道,交易服务就变得必不可少。
Spare a thought, then, for the humble back office. Not only are administrators, accountants, lawyers and managers necessary to make a charity work efficiently – such people make the modern world possible.
所以替不起眼的后勤办公室想想吧。行政人员、会计师、律师和经理不仅对慈善机构的有效运转是必不可少的,也正是他们让社会的现代化成为了可能。
Tim Harford’s book ‘Adapt’ has just been published in paperback (Little, Brown).
蒂姆•哈福德著作《适者生存:为何失败是成功之母》(Adapt: Why Success Always Starts With Failure)平装本刚刚由利特尔-布朗出版社(Little, Brown)出版

译者/王柯伦

Shake-out for China mobile makers




中國手機市場大洗牌
Shake-out for China mobile makers


 


In a factory compound called “Silicon Valley Power” in the southern Chinese city of Shenzhen, one of the white-tiled buildings is locked. Until last year, it was home to a mobile phone assembly line. “They closed down and sent the workers home,” says a guard.
在中國深圳市硅谷動力(Silicon Valley Power)產業園里,一棟外表貼著白瓷磚的樓房大門緊鎖著。直到去年,這棟樓里還運行著一條手機生產線。“他們關門了,然後把工人們都遣散了,”一位保安說。
In Shenzhen, the epicentre of the global handset industry, such closures are quite common these days.
在全球手機業中心深圳,此類工廠關門事件近來非常普遍。
Chinese consumers’ love affair with smartphones, with their internet access and superior functionality, is wreaking havoc with white-label makers, the thousands of small companies that have been providing less affluent consumers with low-end phones.
中國消費者迷上了能夠上網、功能超強的智能手機,給“白標”製造商帶來了嚴重的影響。白標製造商指的是數以千計的小公司,它們一直在向不太富裕的消費者供應低端手機。
Some churn out cheap copies of the latest branded phones but others create new products tailor-made for the needs and tastes of Chinese migrant workers, small town merchants and peasants, such as phones studded with fake crystals and handsets with extra strong speakers and long battery life that allow workers to listen to the radio on a noisy construction site. Their products come unbranded or under little known brands and at a fraction of the price of a Nokia phone.
有些公司根據最新版的品牌手機推出低價的仿製版本,但也有公司根據中國農民工、小鎮商人和農民 的需求與喜好生產新型手機,比如有些手機鑲上了人造水晶,還有些手機裝上了聲音超大的擴音器和待機時間長的電池——這樣他們就可以在吵鬧的建築工地收聽廣 播節目。白標製造商的產品不是沒有品牌,就是使用一些基本沒人聽說過的品牌,而售價只是一部諾基亞(Nokia)手機的幾分之一。
Companies producing these mobile phones accounted for about half of the Chinese handset market in 2010, but now they are struggling. Gartner, the research firm, estimates that white-label handset sales dropped 7 per cent in 2011 to 186m units, or 42 per cent of all mobile phones sold in China, and will plummet another 30 per cent this year.
在2010年,此類手機的生產商大概占據了中國市場的半壁江山,但它們目前都在困境中掙扎。研究公司Gartner估計,2011年白標手機銷售量下降了7%,降至1.86億部(占全國手機銷量的42%),今年還將再降30%。
One reason is the rollout of 3G mobile services in China, which means consumers want to use their phones to access the internet. Operators are also subsidising smartphones and marketing them in small town China, where white-label handsets used to rule.
其中一個原因是中國推出了3G服務,這意味著消費者希望使用手機上網。運營商還對智能手機進行補貼,並把它們推向白標手機曾占統治地位的中國小城鎮市場。
“Consumers are becoming more sophisticated – they are learning to demand quality, and they are becoming brand conscious,” says Sandy Shen, head of consumer research at Gartner in Shanghai.
“消費者變得愈發精明——他們正學著追求質量,品牌意識也越來越濃,”Gartner駐上海消費者研究主管沈哲怡表示。
Hundreds of white-label handset manufacturers have closed down as a result. But for some, the shakeout is an opportunity.
其結果是,數百家白標手機製造商已經關門。但對其中的一些公司而言,行業洗牌也是一種機遇。
Next to the shuttered factory at Silicon Valley Power, SOP Group, a midsize Chinese handset maker, is expanding. “We are investing big in quality control,” says Mei Saichun, the company’s general manager, pointing to machines that bake, steam, smash and scratch his phones to test resilience. SOP manufactures about 300,000 handsets a month, and about half of them are now smartphones.
在離硅谷動力產業園這家關門的公司不遠的地方,一家中等規模的中國手機製造商賽博宇華(SOP Group)卻正在進行擴張。“我們正投入大筆資金用於加強質量控制”,該公司總經理梅賽春表示。說這番話的時候,他指著那些對手機進行烘、蒸、打、劃等 操作以測試其承受能力的機器。賽博宇華每月手機產量大約為30萬部,目前約一半是智能手機。
Companies such as K-Touch, Gionee, Coolpad, Meizu, Oppo and Bubugao are also quietly building their brands, forming a new breed still unnoticed in developed markets where Huawei, the telecom equipment maker, is making a splash by pushing into the consumer market.
天語(K-Touch)、金立(Gionee)、酷派(Coolpad)、魅族 (Meizu)、Oppo和步步高(Bubugao)等公司也在悄悄地建立自己的品牌,形成一股發達市場尚未註意到的力量。在發達市場,電信設備製造商華 為(Huawei)已進入消費者市場,並引起了轟動。
Life for the second-tier handset makers is not easy. The price gap between them and the global brands in smartphones is much smaller than it was between a global brand phone and a low-end feature phone in the past due to operator subsidies.
二線手機製造商的日子並不好過。由於運營商的補貼,它們的產品與全球品牌智能手機之間的價差,遠遠小於過去低端多功能手機與國際品牌手機之間的價差。
The phone companies also find it harder to differentiate themselves. “Smartphones look much more similar to one another – a big touch screen, a small size range, few keys, few colours,” says Su Feng, vice-president at Coolpad.
這些手機製造商還發現,要使自己的手機脫穎而出變得更加困難了。酷派副總裁蘇峰表示:“和以往相比,如今智能手機的外觀更加相像——都有很大的觸摸屏,尺寸變化不大,按鍵和顏色都非常少。”
The companies respond with different strategies. Some target niche markets. Oppo and Bubugao, two companies in the industrial town of Dongguan, not far from Shenzhen, have successfully positioned themselves as phone brands for women. Coolpad, meanwhile, co-operates closely with mobile operators.
這些公司採取了不同的應對策略。有些公司主打細分市場。Oppo和步步高已經成功地將自己定位於女性手機品牌。這兩家公司位於距離深圳不遠的工業城市東莞市。同時,酷派則在與移動運營商進行密切合作。
Meizu, a homegrown answer to Apple in Zhuhai, across the Pearl River from Shenzhen, runs its own app store. “What makes us different in the eyes of our customers are applications, not hardware features,” says Hua Hailiang, the company’s sales head. Meizu’s app store hit 100m downloads last week – just a fraction of Apple’s 25bn worldwide, but a source of pride for the Chinese company.
在與深圳隔珠江相望的珠海市,本土手機品牌魅族也像蘋果(Apple)一樣,開設了自己的應用 商店。該公司營銷總監華海良表示:“使我們在顧客眼中與眾不同的是應用,而不是硬件功能。”上周,魅族應用商店下載量達到了1億次——與蘋果250億次的 全球下載量相比很小——卻已成為這家中國手機廠商的一個值得驕傲之處。
Another area for growth are overseas markets less developed than China. SOP now exports about one-third of its handsets through offices in Indonesia, India and Ghana.
另一個增長領域是發達程度尚不如中國的海外市場。目前,賽博宇華通過其設在印尼、印度和加納的辦事處,將手機產量的大約三分之一齣口到海外市場。
“The fact that some markets in South Asia and Africa still lack 3G, many consumers there cannot read and they just can’t afford smartphones means their demand will remain focused on feature phones for another two or three years,” says Adam Chen, head of the group’s export unit. Despite the challenges, the fast-growing smartphone market should offer room for Chinese second-tier brands. IDC forecast last week that China will overtake the US as the world’s largest smartphone market this year, and that India and Brazil will rise into the top five by 2016.
“南亞和非洲的一些市場仍未推出3G服務,那裡的許多消費者不識字,也買不起智能手機。這意味 著,未來兩至三年內,他們的需求仍將集中在多功能手機上,”賽博宇華集團出口部主管陳燦坤表示。盡管存在諸多挑戰,但快速增長的智能手機市場應該會為中國 二線品牌提供一定的發展空間。研究公司IDC上周預測,中國今年將超過美國成為全球最大的智能手機市場,而到2016年印度和巴西將進入前五行列。
The research firm added: “To realise the full potential of emerging markets, smartphone vendors need to develop low-cost smartphones that provide a full, robust experience.”
IDC補充表示:“為了充分挖掘新興市場的潛能,智能手機廠商需要開發出能夠提供全面、強勁用戶體驗的低價智能手機。”

譯者/邢嵬

2012年3月22日 星期四

Finding the Right Jeremy Lin Storyline



Finding the Right Jeremy Lin Storyline

Executive Summary:

New York Knicks sensation Jeremy Lin is confounding every stereotype we have about modern day basketball stars. Professor Lakshmi Ramarajansuggests that Lin's complex storylines can help us put our own prejudices in focus.

About Faculty in this Article:

HBS Faculty Member Lakshmi Ramarajan
Lakshmi Ramarajan is an assistant professor in the in the Organizational Behavior Unit at Harvard Business School.
New York Knicks basketball sensation Jeremy Lin has attracted worldwide attention because he crosses so many boundaries and defies so many stereotypes.
Lin, an Asian-American (rare in the NBA) who played college hoops at Harvard (even rarer in the NBA), was cut from two teams before landing with the Knicks this year. When injuries to starters gave Lin a chance to play more, he blossomed into a star in just a few games, setting off an episode of "Lin-Sanity" that swept New York and swept up many Asian fans.
At the same time, he confounds us because we can't create a simple storyline around his identity. Is he an underdog or is he privileged? Does he fit in with the NBA or doesn't he? Here are some of the stories we miss in the storylines we do embrace.
The Basketball is Black Story: If the story is one of ethnic prejudice and discrimination, the one that goes, "If he had had a similar high school athletic record and were black, he would have been recruited by a basketball powerhouse instead of Harvard," the questions we ignore are to what extent we implicitly believe that African-Americans have a natural talent for basketball. Or to what extent we believe that Asian-Americans can't play basketball because they are less "American" and basketball is an "American" sport.
The Asian Success Story: If the storyline we embrace is one of Lin's making it as an Asian-American in the NBA, the questions we ignore are: What it would take to make professional sports a "legitimate" career path in Asian-American families? Or how many Asian-American families might steer their children away from basketball because they see it as a "black" thing? Or to what extent Lin's story reinforces the model minority narrative, and whether we may turn against him if or when he fails?
The Privileged Underdog Story: If the storyline is how Lin's relative privilege as a Harvard graduate worked against him, the questions we ignore are about our beliefs about the role of college education for all athletes. The WNBA requires women to wait four years after high school graduation to enter that league. Many more players in the WNBA have college degrees than in the NBA. Do we think a college education is acceptable for WNBA players because women aren't really "jocks"? Do we think NBA players don't need a college education because they are African-American and so less entitled to being "nerds"?
New York Knicks basketball sensation Jeremy LinThe Religion Triumphs All Story: Finally, Lin himself offered the narrative that religion is both a source of struggle and a source of strength in his professional life. The question we ignore is to what extent Lin's Protestant faith makes him seem less "other" to a non-Asian-American audience than his race, especially in the context of current public discourse about politicians who have Muslim names or Mormon faith?
There are two plausible reasons why these other stories have not been told. First, it is difficult to understand multiple identity stories in combination. It means holding on to complexity and not using simple reasoning around one category or another to guide our thinking. The second is fear. It is difficult to talk about the ambiguity that comes with stories of simultaneous privilege and prejudice or stories about a relative underdog making good, not an absolute one.
Each individual storyline makes us hopeful—breaking boundaries suddenly seems possible. But looking at them in isolation reinforces boundaries, reproduces myths, and perpetuates conventional wisdom—all of which lead to inequality. That African-Americans are talented at sports, that Asian-Americans are successful off the court, that jocks can't be nerds, and that Americans are Protestant are just a few of the many hidden stories that our mania about Lin exposes about ourselves. If we can use his multiple stories to put our own prejudices in focus, we can truly break boundaries. 

2012年3月20日 星期二

Achieving Successful Strategic TransformationBy Gerry Johnson, George S. Yip and Manuel Hensmans



Read the Spring issue of MIT SMR, now
 available online

New issue: Surprising ways to rethink your strategy

It's not easy to make significant changes to the way you do business. Relatively few companies are able to make major changes in strategy unless they are prodded to by financial pressure. The Spring issue of MIT Sloan Management Review, out today, features a special focus on strategy and shows how companies can achieve successful major change and long-term financial gain. Read the issue online >>

Achieving Successful Strategic Transformation

By Gerry Johnson, George S. Yip and Manuel Hensmans
March 20, 2012
Few companies decide to adopt new strategies without being forced to by financial trauma. What can we learn from those rare companies that achieve both successful major change and superior long-term financial performance?
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Cadbury’s leaders had long sought to foster a corporate culture characterized by candor.
Image courtesy of Flickr user Auntie P.
Companies that are able to radically change their entrenched ways of doing things and then reclaim leading positions in their industries are the exception rather than the rule. Even less common are companies able to anticipate a new set of requirements and mobilize the internal and external resources necessary to meet them. Instead, the momentum of and commitment to the prevailing strategy usually prevents companies from spotting changes such as a shift in either the market or the technology, and leads to a financial downturn — often a crisis — that, in turn, reveals the need for change. Few companies make the transformation from their old model to a new one willingly. Typically, they begin to search for a new way forward only when they are pushed.
This raises two important questions for corporate managers. First, is decline inevitable? And second, do companies really need a financial downturn to galvanize change, or can they adopt new ways of doing things when not under pressure? Management theorists have observed that decline, while perhaps not inevitable, is at least very likely after a period of time.1 For this reason, some say it’s critical for organizations to develop new dynamic capabilities deliberately rather than relying entirely on their historic capabilities.2
The Leading Question
How do some companies achieve successful strategic transformations?
Findings
  • Successful transformers build alternative coalitions internally.
  • They create a tradition of constructively challenging the status quo.
  • They exploit “happy accidents” to make needed strategic changes.
In order to understand how some companies continue to perform at high levels even as they modify their strategies over time, we studied 215 of the United Kingdom’s largest public companies. We measured performance by, among other things, profits and returns on shareholder funds and on total assets over the 20-year period from 1984 to 2003. Some of the consistent high performers operated in relatively safe and stable markets; such companies were therefore mostly able to maintain high levels of performance without making major strategic changes. Our goal, however, was to draw insights from the small subset of high performers that successfully transformed themselves. Among other things, we wanted to understand the role of history — for example, which management processes and capabilities do companies need to develop over time.
As a result, we decided to focus on three companies that had made successful strategic transformations and compare them with three companies from similar industries that were also successful but hadn’t been required to make a dramatic shift. The first pair, Cadbury Schweppes and Unilever, were longtime international leaders in packaged goods, both with roots extending back to the 19th century.3 The second pair, Tesco and J Sainsbury, were major players in the United Kingdom’s supermarket industry and are among the largest grocery retailers in the world. The third pair, Smith & Nephew and SSL International, operated globally in the market for medical devices and related products.4
How did these companies perform relative to each other? Cadbury Schweppes was clearly dominant over Unilever; it outperformed Unilever every year except 1984, when its performance was only marginally weaker. In the second matchup, Tesco slightly underperformed Sainsbury during the first 10 years of the study before catching up in the middle years and then pulling ahead. Sainsbury had been the industry leader, with consistently high performance, but by the end of the 1990s its performance declined. Although its weak performance spurred Sainsbury’s management to take action, Tesco continued to outperform Sainsbury after 2003. Finally, Smith & Nephew easily outperformed SSL International every year except 1995, when it was marginally weaker.
A Virtuous Cycle for Strategic Transformation

View Exhibit
All six of these companies exhibited success factors of well-managed companies. Nevertheless, Cadbury Schweppes, Tesco and Smith & Nephew all displayed the rare combination of making strategic transformations and, at the same time, achieving strong performance year after year for 20 years relative to industry peers around the world. This prompted us to choose them to examine in depth. These companies, we found, had three fundamental advantages over their peers: They were able to build alternative coalitions with management, create a tradition of constructively challenging business as usual and exploit “happy accidents” to make strategic changes. Together, these advantages helped them establish the virtuous cycle of strategic transformation that their counterparts could not. (See “A Virtuous Cycle for Strategic Transformation.”)

A Tradition of Creating Alternative Coalitions

Although many executives recognize the need to exploit current capabilities while developing new ones, few are very effective at managing this conflicting set of activities. Moreover, most of the advice emanating from scholars who write about “organizational ambidexterity” lacks a historical dimension.5 The companies we studied that transformed themselves had an unusual ability to maintain steady performance while pursuing strategic change. They did this by creating parallel coalitions of senior executives. The first group, typically the more senior one, focused on reinforcing current capabilities, strengths and successes. The second group, usually younger but still senior, actively looked to develop new strategies and capabilities. This parallel system came to be an accepted part of how the company operated. It was encouraged and eventually institutionalized. In particular, the second group often anticipated strategic drift that would leave the company increasingly misaligned with a changing environment.
For instance, the original Tesco model was to “pile it [the merchandise] high, sell it cheap.” Founder Jack Cohen instigated this and perpetuated it through a personal command-and-control management style. Nonetheless, in the 1960s an alternative coalition was created to pursue more modern logistical and operations practices. The new forces introduced Tesco to a corporate model of management control. During the 1970s, the alternative coalition acquired more and more nonfamily members, who receive credit for modernizing Tesco in the 1980s and 1990s. Ian MacLaurin and his team of operations-oriented managers developed their ideas over many years, and they were ready to take charge once the limitations of Cohen’s approach become evident. They did away with the old business model featuring reward stamps when Cohen and his associates stepped down at the end of the 1970s.
In contrast, Sainsbury’s was unable to find a way to go beyond the formula that had made it successful in the 1990s: store configurations that helped maximize sales per square foot, an emphasis on fresh produce, yearly growth of 20%, family control and heavy reliance on a CEO who was widely acknowledged as an intuitive retailer. While this recipe had served the company well, the deeply entrenched business model and management style were difficult to change.
Of the three companies that made successful transformations, none had to reach outside the organization for top leadership. In a sense, they grew their own “outsiders” by encouraging intrapreneurial talent and giving individuals space to comply with their formal job duties while they experimented with and refined their knowledge of alternative approaches to business.

A Tradition of Constructively Challenging Business as Usual

Most companies say they encourage challenges to business as usual or even to the core tenets of the business model. What is less clear is whether and how they actually do it. At companies that achieved major transformations, the development of alternative coalitions frequently occurred in the context of fundamental conflict. At both Tesco and Smith & Nephew, the conflicts were open. Tesco experienced boardroom battles between family members and, later, between the two coalitions of managers. Smith & Nephew endured a major showdown between the “textile traditionalists” and those who wanted to develop new business ideas. At both companies, over time the conflicts became less intense and more respectful.
Constructive challenging at Cadbury Schweppes had a much longer legacy. Cadbury was founded in the early 1820s by Quakers, and its leaders had long sought to foster a corporate culture in which “candor, freedom of speech … a spirit of toleration and liberty … (were) the dominant notes.”6 This cultural tradition was strong, and the merger in 1969 with The Schweppes Co. reinforced it. The two corporate cultures clashed. As former executives reported to us in our interviews, Schweppes people described Cadbury executives as enterprising “choirboys” and “teetotal” Quakers, while the Cadbury side referred to the Schweppes executives as “gin-and-tonic-drinking Londoners” and people with a “short-term” or “cowboy” approach.
At Unilever, in contrast, the internal struggle that might have occurred in 1929 when Margarine Unie merged with Lever Brothers was suppressed through the development of a range of balancing measures that were worked out between the Dutch and British holding companies. As Clive Butler, a former Unilever director, noted, “From the merger in 1929, our strategy has suffered from the need to control the balance between the Dutch and British sides of the business.” The ability to collaborate and innovate internally across corporate and business levels was hampered by equalization agreements and silo-creating resource allocation decisions — most notably about product and geographical responsibilities. At the same time, the company’s legacy of engaging in a wide variety of businesses all over the world fostered a growing disconnect between any corporate strategy and what the business units did. As a result, Unilever units pursued all kinds of businesses and strategies that did not together make up a coherent companywide approach. For example, the company had literally thousands of brands applied inconsistently to products across countries. Hence, there was a widespread view that Unilever was “a fleet of ships doing all kinds of different things, all over the place.”7 Although the need for British-Dutch balancing operations dwindled with the internationalization of the corporate executive and nonexecutive teams, the tendency to circumvent conflict remained.
At the companies that transformed themselves successfully, a tradition of open conflict had a way of evolving into constructive challenging. Over time, the vying for dominance became institutionalized. This was not just a matter of senior executives advocating different points of view; it also involved management systems that embedded such processes across the organization. In contrast, the comparator companies we studied never established a tradition of constructive challenging.

A Tradition of Exploiting Happy Accidents

Not only did new ideas and alternative ideas continually surface in the companies that made successful strategic transformations, but they were aggressively pursued. Thus, the companies were well positioned to turn problems into opportunities. Significantly, we found that alternative leaders were able to accelerate the pace of transformation, not by forcing the issue but by leveraging what we call happy accidents to gain a broad platform of support. Happy accidents are unanticipated circumstances or events that ultimately support transformation in the direction favored by the leaders-in-waiting. For instance, at Smith & Nephew, Chris O’Donnell pressed hard for the articulation of a clearer strategic framework when he took over as CEO in 1997. It’s likely that resistance to change would have won the day if not for a happy accident: O’Donnell’s predecessor had invested heavily in the fast-growing Asian economies to placate disgruntled shareholders. The company started with a new division in Japan in 1990, and also invested in manufacturing plants in Malaysia and offices in China. Just as O’Donnell took over, the East Asian currency crisis hit, wiping out 40% of the company’s profits in 18 months. O’Donnell reacted by initiating comprehensive reviews of strategy and manufacturing, which led to decisions to exit smaller businesses and focus resources on global medical sectors. In the face of the economic turmoil, most of the critics who had resisted O’Donnell’s agenda came around, making possible the company’s successful transformation in subsequent years.
At Cadbury Schweppes, the poor performance of the U.S. confectionery business triggered a hostile takeover bid by General Cinema in 1987. Ultimately, the episode turned out to be a happy accident. It resulted in an increase in the share price, which generated money for acquisitions and functioned as a poison pill that allowed the Cadburys to refine their long-term focus. It also spurred Dominic Cadbury to accelerate the pace of transformation — not just by divesting the food and hygiene businesses, but also by giving alternative leaders within Cadbury Schweppes the opportunity to initiate exciting new developments. These included the Coca-Cola Schweppes Beverages joint venture, the relocation of the beverages headquarters from London to Stamford, Connecticut, and the refocusing of the confectionery division.
Grocery retailer Tesco established and integrated new ways of working that became a catalyst for continuous transformation.
A similar situation occurred at Tesco. In June 1977, management launched Operation Checkout — across-the-board price cuts intended to generate volume and gain market share. The campaign was ridiculed in the press for having narrow operational objectives, and it proved so hard to manage that it almost destroyed the company. It turned out to be a blessing in disguise, however, because it forced the old guard to accept the need to change logistical, distributional and property investment processes. Tesco’s board had approved Operation Checkout, which was led by Ian MacLaurin, under a narrow operational mandate. When the campaign turned out to have very strategic consequences, the old guard could not cope anymore and turned the strategic command over to MacLaurin and David Malpas. They and other alternative leaders, by force majeure, were granted the power to complete the ambitious strategic transformation plans they had envisioned years before. Family resistance to the new team’s plans crumbled, and a decisive shift from family control to a process of distributed managerial engagement and change began.
Successive alternative coalitions at Cadbury Schweppes, Tesco and Smith & Nephew alike each took advantage of four major (different) happy accidents during the last four decades. Their counterparts Unilever, Sainsbury and SSL International, lacking a tradition of anticipation, were unable to convert problems and crises into happy accidents. They dealt narrowly with problems on their own rather than using them as triggers for broader changes. For example, Sainsbury steadily struggled with its increasing loss of market share to Tesco but did not change its business model or management approach. Similarly, Unilever gradually lost market position to Procter & Gamble but failed to develop a more aggressive strategy and style.

The Rewards of Tradition

We have already noted how the companies that successfully transformed themselves reaped financial benefits, but what about their strategic success? By the late 2000s, all three companies were in superb strategic and competitive positions, with well-defined management processes. Cadbury Schweppes had grown from a modest-sized national competitor into a global leader in two of the most competitive industries in the world, and it eventually became a keenly sought acquisition target. Tesco, meanwhile, established and integrated new ways of working that became a catalyst for continuous transformation. It launched multiple retail formats, significantly reduced the size of its headquarters staff, streamlined management layers and began an international expansion, becoming one of the most successful multinational retailers. Tesco is widely regarded as one of the best-managed companies in the United Kingdom.
Smith & Nephew, for its part, has repeatedly made changes and explained them to investors in ways that retain their confidence. Its tradition of transformation has helped the company stay a step ahead of changes in the competitive environment, and engage in a self-paced rather than forced transformational process. This has resulted in more than 20 years of above-average growth and provided a buffer against the rapid changes in technology and the market that are inherent in the medical devices industry.

Developing Traditions for Transformation

If companies are to sustain high performance and transform their strategies, they need to foster alternative management coalitions and value constructive tension and challenges to the status quo. We have developed eight recommendations for accelerating these changes.
1. Build on history. The first thing to recognize is the importance of valuing history and building on it. In the cases of Tesco and Smith & Nephew, the contestation we saw was built on conflict, even emotional conflict, decades ago. Over time, consciously or not, the skirmishing evolved into a more respectful tug of war. In the case of Cadbury, a tradition rooted in the company’s Quaker past was reinforced by a clash of cultures that followed the merger with Schweppes. Building on history requires managers to reflect on the evolution of their organization and the legacy they can draw on. Which traditions are present, at least in embryonic form, and which ones are absent? In the light of the answer, what new steps could be taken?
2. Select and develop a new generation of leaders. All good companies carry out succession and talent planning. But too often they focus too much on maintaining the current mold. In a company that’s serious about transformation, succession planning requires building different capabilities. New generations of leaders need to be groomed and encouraged to develop alternative coalitions and business models. Of course, this is easier said than done. To make it happen, current leaders must nurture replacements who will question, modify or even be willing to reject the company’s heritage. In the late 1990s, Tesco CEO Ian MacLaurin and managing director David Malpas recognized this quality in Terry Leahy, a young manager who would become a major change agent. Malpas explained to us his approach to management talent-spotting: “I used to categorize youngsters in two [groups]: those who believed the corporation was a corporation and they worked for it, and those who believed it was their business.” As much as he valued the former group, it was the latter group that he looked to for the next generation of leaders.
3. Accept and encourage constructive mobility. In a similar vein, it’s important to accept and encourage constructive mobility in management. This does not necessarily mean bringing in outsiders to run the business: On the whole, the successful transformers developed their own managers and leaders internally. However, rather than appointing the most predictable successors, companies need to adopt a deliberate policy of cultivating internal talent. In other words, in addition to fostering alternative coalitions, welcoming challenge and encouraging divergent perspectives on the future of the business, managers should identify leaders who, while respecting the past, have a distinctively different view of the future.
4. Ensure that decision making allows for dissent. There’s a fundamental difference between an organization built to maintain consensus around a dominant logic and one where managers naturally challenge it. Butler, the former Unilever director, recognized that Unilever “had many layers of people that were clever enough to think of many reasons why a new idea wouldn’t work.” Tesco’s Malpas, on the other hand, described Tesco as an organization where new ideas took on momentum across different levels of managers: “You have bright people who have ideas and want to mold the business their way, so an initiative gets to the boss at the next level who embraces it, and it becomes his scheme; it gets to the next level and he embraces it, and it becomes his scheme. How the hell do you stop it?” A decision-making process that allows for dissent and challenge works only among people who can live with, and indeed welcome, challenge.
5. Create enabling structures that encourage tension. Creative tension between opposing views can also be fostered structurally. When Smith & Nephew bought an R&D facility from another company, and when Tesco gave responsibility for demographic profiling to the marketing department rather than the real estate department, the companies ensured that there would be new and different perspectives. Such changes alone will not guarantee that alternative views will be heard and taken seriously — that will depend on the relevance of the views and who in the organization promotes them. But changing the structure can make a difference in how people see ideas internally.
6. Expect everyone to get behind decisions once they are made. Essential though constructive confrontation, contestation and experimentation are, there needs to be a point when leadership makes decisions and the different parties fall in line. This requires what we call “corporate maturity”: having the confidence to see the value of dissent while accepting the need to move forward for the wider good. Taking this position is not an argument for suppressing dissent. Rather, it’s an argument for appreciating the value of diversity and recognizing that there are times when top management needs to take charge. In our research, we found that failures occurred not so much when top management avoided making decisions but when management mishandled the internal debate, by stifling it, cutting it short or failing to build management teams with enough confidence to overcome doubts.
7. Develop an overarching rationale. Although the executives with whom we discussed our findings were wary of attempting to “create cultures,” they agreed that managers needed to develop clear positions concerning “what we are about.” At Tesco in the 1990s, for example, managers engaged in spirited discussions about how to balance the needs of customers with those of shareholders and employees. They concluded that success required focusing on customers. Dominic Cadbury noted that the starting point is the company’s values: “These do not happen by chance, and they can’t drift either. There has to be some management there.” And values need to be more than words — they should be believable and evident in top managers’ behavior.
The emphasis on a clear rationale supported by strong values must allow for the necessary diversity of views and ideas. Sainsbury had in place a very clear rationale and set of values. Unfortunately, one of those values was that dissent is dangerous. This offers a lesson from complexity theory: Organizations need “order-generating” or “simple” rules8 that are few in number but sufficiently clear to provide overall direction while at the same time allowing for differences of views and ideas.
8. Beware of market size and dominance. Each of the successful strategic transformers we studied developed some of the characteristics that helped them succeed while competing against dominant players in their industries. Indeed, Cadbury Schweppes, Smith & Nephew and Tesco saw themselves as seriously threatened. This was not the case for Unilever or Sainsbury, both of which were major forces in their markets. As Dominic Cadbury, the retired chairman of Cadbury Schweppes, put it, “Unilever was such a different size that … it would be infinitely more difficult to galvanize [the company] to think of itself as an endangered species.” Butler conceded, “Unilever has had to grow smaller to be like that.” This raises an important question: As once-threatened companies such as Tesco become industry leaders, will management lose sight of the very qualities that helped create their success?
Butler’s comment about the challenge of mobilizing an organization raises issues about both complexity and size. Tesco was always a retail business; Cadbury, while operating in a number of different businesses, was much less diverse than Unilever; Smith & Nephew was less diversified than SSL International. Complex, diversified organizations such as Unilever often try to reduce their complexity to realize a corporate strategy of having the right mix of businesses. We believe that there is a different reason for reducing complexity: Ongoing strategic transformation requires relatively focused businesses.
Institutionalizing traditions does not take place overnight. Therefore, our proposals are the antithesis of short-term management. The capabilities to avoid strategic drift must be nurtured over the long term. However, today’s organizations have one important advantage: The exceptional organizations we studied developed their skills and traditions over many years — and without the benefit of the lessons we have drawn from them. Now that we have identified how traditions of transformation are developed, today’s managers have the opportunity to build on this experience to establish their own traditions more rapidly and also more deliberately.
(Reprint #:53308)
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Gerry Johnson is an emeritus professor of strategic management at Lancaster University Management School in the United Kingdom. George S. Yip is a professor of management at China Europe International Business School in Shanghai. Manuel Hensmans is a professor of strategic management at Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management at Université Libre de Bruxelles in Belgium. They are the authors of a forthcoming book on strategic transformation.

Google-Motorola Deal Remains Under China Review

自從中國約十年前懂得用反壟斷法整日本公司
太好了

Motorola公司對中國有點小恩
Google公司與中國有點小仇.....

Google-Motorola Deal Remains Under China Review
Google's $12.5 billion bid for Motorola Mobility will undergo an additional round of scrutiny by China's antitrust agency.

台灣人愛拼命 會過勞死



Deaths spotlight Taiwan's 'overwork' culture

File photo Taiwan workers protest in Taipei Taiwanese labour activists rallied at the Council of Labour Affairs in Taipei last year
Working hard is ingrained in Taiwanese society. But recent deaths attributed to overwork are leading people to question the culture for the first time.
The deaths of nearly 50 workers last year were blamed on working more overtime than allowed by law. This figure was as much as four times higher than the previous year, according to the Council of Labor Affairs (CLA).
There have been many high-profile cases over the past two years. They include:
  • Hsu Shao-pin, 29, an engineer at Nanya Technology, who worked 99 hours of overtime monthly, six months before he died. His parents found him slumped over his desk at home in 2010. He had died from a heart attack.
  • Chiang Ding-kuo, 29, a security guard for Chien Hsiang Security Service, suffered a stroke while working in 2010. In the nine years before he died, he worked 288 to 300 hours a month.
  • Hsieh Ming-hung, 30, an engineer for smartphone maker HTC, died in his dormitory in February. He worked an average of 68 hours of overtime monthly.
Investigators tasked by the government to look into what caused deaths related to overwork found that the victims generally had congenital conditions, especially heart problems. They also had high-risk factors, such as being overweight and being a smoker, which had been aggravated by too much work.
Many of them were in their late 20s to 40s.
'Finding loopholes' The companies generally do not dispute the CLA's findings. They are only obliged to pay a relatively small fine for violating overtime laws. The labour insurance bureau compensates the victims' families for up to 3.75 years of their salary.

Start Quote

We've had these cases all along, including migrant workers who died from overwork. But in the past, some people thought it was just a regular heart attack.”
Sun Yu-lian Secretary-general, Taiwan Labor Front
"We've had these cases all along, including migrant workers who died from overwork. But in the past, some people thought it was just a regular heart attack," said Sun Yu-lian, secretary-general of Taiwan Labor Front.
"What's different about the recent cases is that the families dare to speak out."
Although Taiwan's labour law mandates that workers should not do more than 46 hours of overtime a month, some could be exempted from this if they agree to it.
"There are laws, but there are problems with the laws being followed. It has to do with the local culture," said Peng Feng-me, a specialist at the CLA's labour safety and health department.
"Taiwan's employers don't follow the laws. They find loopholes because they think no one will check."
Based on CLA data, the number of overwork cases is disproportionately low compared to Taiwan's work force and to similar economies like Japan and South Korea, leading many to believe the problem is under-reported.
Hotline
Taiwan ranks among the top countries with the longest working day, based on statistics.
On average, Taiwanese employees work about 2,200 hours annually - that is 20% more than Japan and the US, 30% more than the UK and 50% more than Germany, according to government data.
A government study in 2010 found that 80% of the big Taiwanese tech companies being investigated violated overtime laws.
But some officials say that conditions have improved.
"In recent years, we've made changes in the law to let workers have more recreation time," said Lo Chih-chiang, who until recently was a spokesman for the president's office.
Most workers now get two days off a week. The government has also threatened to increase fines and even jail employers. It also set up a hotline for violation reports and even lowered the maximum work hours for certain occupations.
But many still see 12-hour work days as the norm, with some managers even giving up annual holidays.
Business association head Lin Bing-bin Working hard in Taiwan is important to economic development, employers maintain
Susan Tai, who juggles 10-hour working days with caring for a baby, said leaving work early was not an option. "My colleagues would resent me and my boss would think I don't have enough work to do," she said.
Too late Many also argue that Taiwan has to work so much to stay competitive.
Lin Bing-bin, who heads a business association, said that working hard in Taiwan is important to economic development.
"We, employers, agree we should raise workers' benefits, but we should not forget the hard-working attitude is a very important, basic factor of a country's economic development," said Mr Lin.
"The laws can be revised to be more strict and complete, but they shouldn't be too inflexible. If they are too strict, it could hurt Taiwan's economic development."
Trade unions are nearly non-existent or too weak to help pursue financial compensation. Many are also doubtful that the government will severely punish violators.
The problem with existing laws is the penalties are too light, analysts say. "Stepping up fines or jailing is too late - the worker has already died," Taiwan Labor Front's Mr Sun said.
But some companies, especially those with reported overwork-related deaths, are beginning to take notice. HTC banned employees from working past midnight after an engineer died, local media report. Nanya Technology now requires workers to get permission to work overtime, said vice-president Pei Lin Pai.
Mr Lo from the president's office said that as Taiwan seeks to "create a knowledge and innovation-based economy", "working hard will take on a new meaning". This means that long hours may not necessarily be the norm, but having time to recharge and be more creative should be factored in.
But while the prevailing culture continues, more workers have been reporting violations anonymously.

2012年3月16日 星期五

UK to 'scrap public sector national pay rates'

Chancellor George Osborne to 'scrap public sector national pay rates'

George Osborne George Osborne is set to outline his plans on Wednesday in the Budget
Chancellor George Osborne is expected to reveal plans to scrap public sector national pay rates in the Budget.
He is thought to have backed the plan after Treasury research found people in public sector roles earn, on average, 8% more than their private sector counterparts across England and Wales.
Local factors, such as the cost of living and private sector pay rates, are now set to be taken into account.
The Public and Commercial Services union said it opposed the plans.
The move, expected to be announced in the Budget on Wednesday, would mean a teacher working in Sunderland would have a different pay packet to a colleague in Surrey.
Local pay rates for teaching and hospital staff could begin next year.
A Treasury source told the BBC's Chris Mason the move is not about saving money but about ensuring the UK has "a responsive, modern labour force".
The source told our correspondent the move is seen as "pro-growth" because it would help make the private sector to become more competitive.
A PCS spokesman told the BBC it is "opposed" to the plans because such a move "will drive down pay in the regions".
He added that the public sector could find it harder to "recruit and retain staff".
Other trade unions have previously raised concerns about the difficulty of attracting public sector staff to work in relatively poorer areas where they may have to take a pay cut to take the role.
Mr Osborne initially set out the idea in the Autumn Statement.
At the time, he announced a review of national pay rates for public servants and asked the independent pay review bodies to report back in July.

人類決策藝術/ Nike 致歉/ 高階主管女性越多越好!

研究:企業高階主管女性越多越好!


2012-03 Web only 作者:經濟學人

一年前,歐盟司法委員Viviane Reding公開邀請上市公司,希望它們能承諾在2015年將董事會的女性比例提升至30%,2020年升至40%。
目前只有24家公司簽署了該項承諾。因此,Reding在3月5日宣佈進行為時3個月的公開諮詢,問問民眾希望歐盟採取什麼樣的措 施。歐盟大企業中,目前只有13.7%的董事是女性,女性總裁或董事長就更少,僅3.2%。歐盟職場新鮮人的男女比例大致相同,但越往企業高層女性就越 少,最高層則幾乎見不到女性。
許多研究顯示,高階職位女性較多的企業,表現也比較好,讓更多女性進入董事會似乎也相當合理,問題在於該怎麼 做。挪威在十年前就設定了董事會女性成員的最低比例,目前已升至40%,部分歐盟國家最近也跟進,例如法國就在一年前立法,規定上市和未上市大公司必須為 兩性各保留20%的董事會席次。
大部分歐洲民眾似乎也支持此事,民調顯示,3/4的民眾贊成立法確保董事會的性別平衡。企業大多反對最低限 額,擔心這會讓公司無法任命最棒的人才;批評者表示,最低限額會讓經驗不足的女性進入董事會,部分優秀女性通常會擔任許多企業的董事,並沒有辦法真正增加 企業高層的女性人數。
 

Nike Says It's Sorry For "Black and Tan" Naming Gaffe


The shoemaker apologizes for sneakers that share a name with British forces accused of murdering Irish citizens.



人類決策藝術


2012年3月14日 星期三

Health Reform by the Numbers


Health Reform by the Numbers

By using data to target inefficiencies, leading healthcare systems are proving technology’s potential to revolutionize care delivery.

More than a year after the Affordable Care Act was passed, it is clear that a sweeping policy change will not be enough to repair the U.S. healthcare system. As an industrialist in the healthcare business, I can see that the fundamental driver of high costs and quality issues is the inconsistency of healthcare delivery and outcomes from region to region, state to state, and even hospital to hospital. Such variance is evil: It is bad for your health, it is bad for your local doctor’s business, and it is bad for the healthcare system as a whole. But I also know that the part of the business perceived as less exciting — process and information technology — can drive revolutionary change.

The good news is that certain pioneering institutions are already using IT and process engineering to reduce costs and improve health outcomes. They approach healthcare as a science, not as an art. They’ve used data to target areas of underperformance and waste, and they’ve employed technology to transform their systems. Their solutions can serve as best practices for patients and businesses alike. (Disclosure: GE makes some of the technologies used by these companies.)

Virtua, a comprehensive multi-hospital system based in southern New Jersey, is considered one of the best-performing hospitals in the nation — both clinically and financially. Its leaders accomplished this by using data to understand performance and drive day-to-day process improvements while expanding their technology capabilities at the system’s nine locations. Virtua has seen many changes system-wide, ranging from improving staff scheduling to decreasing by two-thirds the amount of time it takes to treat a woman who discovers a lump in her breast. As a hospital system that generates in excess of US$1 billion in annual revenue, Virtua has been able to save $23 million in unnecessary costs since incorporating Six Sigma as a process improvement tool.

Virginia’s Bon Secours Richmond Health System, which recently announced a data-rich “no-wait emergency room,” has also saved $5 million through technology that enabled the organization to eliminate unnecessary spending on equipment; the health system now deploys 30 percent fewer intravenous pumps alone. And with the use of technology and a strong governance structure, the system estimates that its 20-minute reduction in overall surgical procedure time could expand access to more than 500 additional patients per year.

The Tampa, Fla.–based H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute, one of the leading cancer centers in the United States, used sophisticated computer modeling to reconfigure its surgical block schedule, freeing up capacity for 900 additional cancer procedures a year without adding operating rooms or hours. That new capacity improves access for patients (up to 12 percent more medical procedures can be performed) and makes good business sense (about an $8 million annual margin for the center).

Sometimes less is more. At Boston’s Brigham and Women’s Hospital, GE is supporting efforts to ensure more appropriate imaging. Software that aggregates decades of evidence-based medical best practices provides diagnostic options based on historical effectiveness and patient history. It may seem counterintuitive for a medical device manufacturer to recommend fewer tests, but this kind of effort has the potential to curb the number of unnecessary imaging tests given at hospitals and outpatient clinics around the world. If you understand variance, you know it goes both ways: For every unnecessary scan out there, somebody who needs one is not getting it. Those undiagnosed patients will inevitably cost more to treat down the road. Managing variance will improve healthcare quality and lower costs at the same time.

These institutions are at the vanguard of healthcare reform, harnessing data in practical ways to breathe new life into the existing system. It’s time to focus on solutions and employ the data, processes, and technologies available today to give doctors, nurses, and all other healthcare providers the best environment in which to perform. We know from extensive industrial experience that total dedication to efficiency will pay off in terms of improved quality, enhanced customer experience, greater patient safety, and reduced costs. Thoughtful leaders will become the heroes of healthcare reform by following the same formula.

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